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ARTICLES
FEE RETRENCHMENT IN IMMIGRATION
HABEAS
Seth Katsuya Endo*
For noncitizens facing removal, habeas corpus provides one of very few
avenues for Article III review. For decades, habeas proceedings have been
interpreted as falling under the ambit of the Equal Access to Justice Act
(EAJA), which provides for the award of attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties
in suits against the federal government. But this understanding is being
challenged, threatening the judicial backstop to executive and legislative
overreach in immigration. Reducing the ability of lawyers to recover their
fees in these circumstances will reduce the number and quality of habeas
challenges by individuals being detained while they await removal—a
particularly salient worry given the aggressive enforcement and misconduct
by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement over the past few years.
This Article demonstrates that reading out habeas proceedings from the
EAJA is best understood as an example of the federal courts’ jurisprudential
shift against the private enforcement of civil rights—that is, the rights
retrenchment movement. This case study also shows how nonacquiescence
permits agencies to selectively tee up issues for retrenchment and magnify
the structural power differences between them and the individuals they face
in litigation. This Article then applies a procedural justice lens to
normatively assess whether the EAJA should cover immigration habeas.
Using the Mathews v. Eldridge framework for this inquiry, this Article
identifies the strong private interests at stake, the value of the process, and
the government’s interest, mapping these factors to the accuracy, efficiency,
and participation norms.

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. Ingrid Eagly,
Brandon Garrett, Kevin Johnson, Jennifer Lee Koh, Gregory Sisk, John Stinneford, and
Michael Wishnie generously offered insightful comments that greatly shaped and improved
this work. Additionally, the feedback I received from my UF colleagues from our internal
junior faculty workshop and from the participants in the Sixth Annual Civil Procedure
Workshop was very helpful in developing the work. The Article grew out of an earlier amicus
project, which received support from Professor Garrett, Professor Sisk, and Professor Wishnie
along with Eric Freedman and Randy Hertz. Jared Crum, Sarah Ruckriegle, and Sean Marotta
were extraordinary driving forces of the amicus brief and cannot be thanked enough. Thank
you to Mina Juhn, Julia Hatheway, Giovanni Scarcella, and the staff of the Fordham Law
Review for their work on this piece.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine moving to the United States with your family as an
eleven-year-old child. Over the next eighteen years, your parents and sibling
become citizens or lawful permanent residents. You are pursuing citizenship,
too. But, at the end of 2016, you are taken into custody by U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for detention until you can be sent back to
Colombia because of a conviction for possession of a small amount of
marijuana that occurred almost a decade earlier. Before an immigration
judge, you argue that the government failed to prove that your conviction was
for a removable offense because the governing statute contains a
personal-use exception for marijuana possession. After almost two years of
detention, the Board of Immigration Appeals agrees with you, and the
immigration judge’s removal ruling is reversed. But the government still
contests your release, raising several new arguments and engaging in a
pattern of delay, omission, and misrepresentation. You file a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. After having spent 796 days in confinement, you get
to present your arguments to a district court judge who finds that you are
constitutionally entitled to a bond hearing. At the bond hearing, the
immigration judge determines that you do not pose a danger to the
community and sets your bond at $5000. The following day, you are
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released. This is the specific story of Jose Andres Obando-Segura, but the
general narrative is all too common; in 2019, ICE recorded 123,128
administrative arrests and removed 226,400 individuals after detaining them
for months or years.1
While Mr. Obando-Segura was released from detention, the litigation was
only a partial victory. Mr. Obando-Segura moved for attorneys’ fees as a
prevailing party under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA).2 But the
district court determined that the immigration habeas proceeding was not a
“civil action” within the meaning of the EAJA, and therefore, Mr.
Obando-Segura’s counsel was ineligible for court-awarded fees.3 The Fourth
Circuit then affirmed the district court’s decision, creating a circuit split on
this issue.4
Standard statutory interpretation tools do not support an argument that the
EAJA’s use of the term “civil action” excludes habeas proceedings.5 But
restricting noncitizen detainees’ ability to meaningfully access justice is part
of a very old pattern. For decades, the U.S. Congress limited Article III
review of all sorts of immigration issues without encountering much
resistance from the U.S. Supreme Court. For example, in 2020, the Court
held that a statutory limit to habeas review for noncitizens detained for
expedited removal did not violate either the Suspension Clause or the Due
Process Clause.6 Noncitizens’ remedies and fee shifting as a tool to promote
the private enforcement of civil rights have been met with similar antipathy.7
Weaving these strands together, the Court held that immigration proceedings
before administrative law judges are not covered by the EAJA.8
With this background, interpreting the EAJA to exclude immigration
habeas is easily understood as an example of the federal courts’
jurisprudential shift against the private enforcement of civil rights. Building
on the foundational rights retrenchment scholarship, this Article contributes
to the literature by concretely describing an important piece of the story: how

1. ICE, FISCAL YEAR 2019 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 8, 12,
18 (2019) [hereinafter 2019 ICE REPORT], https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Document/2019/eroReportFY2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4QX-T28Q].
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2412.
3. Memorandum to Counsel, Obando-Segura v. Barr, No. GLR-17-319 (D. Md. Oct. 18,
2019).
4. Obando-Segura v. Garland, 999 F.3d 190, 191 (4th Cir. 2021) (“Because the Act does
not provide a basis for Obando to recover attorney’s fees, we affirm the district court’s
denial.”).
5. Compare id., with Kholyavskiy v. Schlecht, 479 F. Supp. 2d 897, 901 (E.D. Wis.
2007) (rejecting arguments that EAJA’s use of “civil action” excludes habeas proceedings).
6. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1968–69 (2020).
7. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 749–50 (2020); Buckhannon Bd. & Care
Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598, 609 (2001); see also Kevin
R. Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 2009–13: A New Era of Immigration Law
Unexceptionalism, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 57, 73, 106 (2015); David Luban, Taking Out the
Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 241
(2003).
8. See Ardestani v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 502 U.S. 129, 138 (1991).
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agency nonacquiescence9 allows the executive branch to selectively develop
case law to present to appellate courts and magnifies its structural power
advantage.10 Here, the agency’s nonacquiescence threatens the availability
of attorneys’ fees in immigration habeas, weakening the judicial backstop to
executive and legislative overreach in immigration removal proceedings.11
Once viewed as an example of rights retrenchment, the question of
whether a habeas proceeding is a “civil action” under the EAJA raises
procedural justice concerns beyond the stand-alone statutory interpretation
issues. Excluding habeas from the EAJA’s ambit is inconsistent with a
traditional weighing of the private interest at stake, the value of the process,
and the government’s interest. These three factors from Mathews v.
Eldridge12 provide a general framework for evaluating procedural issues—
and this includes habeas as exemplified by its use in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.13
Part I of this Article describes the important role of habeas corpus in
securing judicial review of immigration decisions to remove noncitizens and
links its importance to the availability of attorneys’ fees under the EAJA.
Part II presents a case study of ICE’s attempts to establish that the EAJA’s
use of the term “civil action” excludes habeas proceedings. It first shows
why standard statutory interpretation tools strongly resist this narrow
reading. Next, it explains that the narrow reading is appropriately read as
part of the federal courts’ resistance to the private enforcement of civil rights.
It then details the implications of the agency’s use of nonacquiescence as a
mechanism for retrenchment. Part III uses a procedural justice lens to further
examine the issue, primarily applying the Mathews framework to
normatively evaluate whether the EAJA should include immigration habeas.
This analysis shows that treating habeas as a “civil action” better comports
with notions of procedural justice because of the strong private interests in
liberty and in remaining in the United States, the value of promoting legal
counsel, and the government’s interest in enforcing the law. This Article
concludes with a discussion of the broader application of the Mathews
analysis and identifies issues for additional investigation.

9. See Vertex Surgical, Inc. v. Paradigm Biodevices, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 2d 226, 238 n.14
(D. Mass. 2009) (noting that “federal agencies have developed nonacquiesence policies,
whereby the agency instructs its employees to follow an agency position regarding governing
law, rather than an adverse circuit court decision, while the agency relitigates the issue in other
circuits in order to challenge circuit case law with which it disagrees.”).
10. See, e.g., STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION passim (2017); see also Pamela S.
Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 185.
11. This is especially troubling given the aggressive enforcement and COVID-related
issues over the past few years. See, e.g., 2019 ICE REPORT, supra note 1; see also Valenzuela
Arias v. Decker, No. 20–2802, 2020 WL 1847986, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2020) (granting
temporary restraining order requiring ICE to release two at-risk detainees and prohibiting their
rearrest during the pendency of their immigration proceedings).
12. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
13. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).

2022]

FEE RETRENCHMENT

1493

I. ANCHORING THE JUDICIAL BACKSTOP
Despite the potentially dire consequences, immigration proceedings to
either deport or exclude noncitizens (collectively, “removal proceedings”)
are largely conducted without much, if any, oversight by Article III courts.14
The conventional understanding of current immigration proceedings begins
with the frontline enforcement of federal immigration statutes by the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
and ICE agents.15 The CBP and ICE agents file a charging document with
the immigration court, which is run by the Department of Justice’s (DOJ)
Executive Office for Immigration Review.16 The immigration judge first
determines whether the noncitizen is removable and then assesses whether
the noncitizen is otherwise eligible for relief.17 Appeals from the
immigration courts initially stay within the administrative body, going to the
DOJ’s Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).18 Only after the BIA issues a
final decision may a noncitizen appeal an immigration decision to the federal
courts of appeal—and, even then, the Article III court’s jurisdiction has been
significantly curtailed by congressional statute.19
Habeas is one of the few procedural bulwarks that stands against the tide
of aggressive executive and legislative action, allowing noncitizens to contest
their detention before an independent Article III judge.20 And the use of
habeas has risen in tandem with increased immigration enforcement by the
executive branch—from 2012 to 2017, the number of habeas petitions filed
by noncitizens challenging their detention rose by 76 percent.21 Habeas is an
especially vital mechanism because, until recently, courts have consistently
held that noncitizens who prevailed in their habeas petitions challenging their

14. Emily Ryo, Fostering Legal Cynicism Through Immigration Detention, 90 S. CAL. L.
REV. 999, 1005–06 (2017); Faiza W. Sayed, Note, Challenging Detention: Why Immigrant
Detainees Receive Less Process than “Enemy Combatants” and Why They Deserve More,
111 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1851–52 (2011). There are, of course, many other types of
immigration proceedings that are beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Andrew
Hammond, The Immigration-Welfare Nexus in a New Era?, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 501
passim (2018).
15. See Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L.
REV. 181, 188 (2017).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 189. While beyond the scope of this Article, the recent history of immigration
proceedings is a deeply problematic story of decreasing independence by the administrative
law judges. See Mary Holper, The Fourth Amendment Implications of “U.S. Imitation
Judges,” 104 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1306 (2020); Amit Jain, Bureaucrats in Robes:
Immigration “Judges” and the Trappings of “Courts,” 33 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 261, 270–76
(2019).
18. Koh, supra note 15, at 192 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2016)).
19. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(B), (D)).
20. See David Cole, No Clear Statement: An Argument for Preserving Judicial Review of
Removal Decisions, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 427, 428 (1998).
21. See Anthony R. Enriquez, Note, Structural Due Process in Immigration Detention, 21
CUNY L. REV. 35, 53 n.109 (2017) (citing Suits Challenging Confinement of Noncitizens
Jump, TRAC REPORTS (Feb. 21, 2017), https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/civil/460/
[https://perma.cc/TWN4-QDXG]).
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detention could take advantage of the EAJA’s fee-shifting provisions,
providing an economic incentive for lawyers to take these cases.22
A. Availability of Judicial Review
The writ of habeas corpus may be used to require a detainee to be before a
court so the court can determine whether the detention is legal.23 The writ
originated in England, was then enfolded into the colonies’ common-law
tradition, and was implicitly carried into the U.S. Constitution through the
Suspension Clause.24 Then, more directly, as part of the Judiciary Act of
1789,25 Congress provided for writs of habeas corpus to be issued by the
federal courts.26
Historically, habeas corpus has been especially significant in the
immigration context because it was the only judicial process available to
noncitizens to contest removal orders before the mid-1950s.27 The
Immigration Act of 1917 and earlier immigration statutes called for treating
the attorney general’s decisions on immigration matters as “final.”28 In
Heikkila v. Barber,29 the Supreme Court interpreted this as “precluding
judicial intervention in deportation cases except insofar as it was required by
the Constitution.”30
While Heikkila was pending, Congress passed the Immigration and
Nationality Act,31 which included similar language.32 And, shortly after

22. See, e.g., Vacchio v. Ashcroft, 404 F.3d 663, 665 (2d Cir. 2005); infra Parts II.B–C
(discussing other cases holding the same).
23. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 737 (2008) (defining habeas as “a writ
employed to bring a person before a court, most frequently to ensure that the party’s
imprisonment or detention is not illegal” (quoting Habeas Corpus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(8th ed. 2004))); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the
Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 970–71 (1998).
24. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 438 (11th
ed. 1791) (describing the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 as the “bulwark of [the British]
Constitution”); Ex parte Bollman and ex parte Swartwout, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93–94
(1807); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”).
Numerous books and articles provide excellent descriptions of the writ’s history. See, e.g.,
ERIC M. FREEDMAN, MAKING HABEAS WORK: A LEGAL HISTORY (2018); Neuman, supra note
23, at 970–76; Brandon L. Garrett, Habeas Corpus and Due Process, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 47,
60–63 (2012).
25. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
27. See Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration
Act, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1963, 1967–69 (2000) (describing history and noting that “[f]rom
1882 until 1952, no express authorization for judicial control of administrative decisions
existed in the immigration statutes”).
28. Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889–90 (repealed
1952).
29. 345 U.S. 229 (1953).
30. Id. at 234–35.
31. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
8, 18, and 22 U.S.C.).
32. Heikkila, 345 U.S. at 232 n.4.
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Heikkila was issued, the Court in Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro33 was tasked with
determining whether the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act likewise
precluded judicial review other than habeas.34 The Supreme Court held that
the Act’s language should be freshly interpreted in light of the purpose and
legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA).35
Given the APA’s expansion of judicial review of administrative actions, the
Court held that the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act’s use of the term
“final” spoke to administrative finality and did not preclude judicial review
of administrative actions in the immigration context.36
In response to the Pedreiro holding, Congress passed the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1961 (INA) and added section 106, which restricted
review of deportation decisions to the courts of appeal.37 Congress also
amended the Act to provide for habeas review of exclusion orders.38
Together, these developments provided for relatively comprehensive
APA-based judicial review of removal orders.39
In the past twenty-five years, Congress has attempted to limit judicial
review of immigration actions several times, sparking legions of legal
challenges and scholarly discussion.40 In 1996, as part of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Congress struck the
INA’s habeas provision and limited judicial review of deportation for
noncitizens deportable on criminal grounds.41 Later in that same year,
Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), jettisoning the INA’s section 106 for a
new section 242, which eliminated the differences in judicial review for
deportation and exclusion orders, permitting both to be appealed to the courts
of appeal.42 The IIRIRA also included the AEDPA’s jurisdiction-stripping
33. 349 U.S. 48 (1955).
34. See generally id.
35. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706; Pedreiro, 349 U.S. at 50.
36. Id. at 50–52.
37. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 5, 75 Stat. 650, 651;
see also Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 306 (2001) (describing
history); Foti v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 375 U.S. 217, 226 (1963) (holding that even
discretionary denials were appealable to the court of appeals); Hiroshi Motomura,
Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Habeas Corpus, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 459, 461–63 (2006) (summarizing legislative developments).
38. See Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 5, 75 Stat. 650, 651.
39. David M. McConnell, Judicial Review Under the Immigration and Nationality Act:
Habeas Corpus and the Coming of Real ID (1996–2005), 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 75, 81 (2007)
(“The resulting review scheme, described below, afforded non-citizens judicial review more
closely resembling APA review than the narrow habeas corpus review described in
Heikkila.”).
40. See, e.g., Nancy Morawetz, Detention Decisions and Access to Habeas Corpus for
Immigrants Facing Deportation, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 13, 15–16 (2005); Lenni B.
Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of Immigration
Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1411–12 (1997); McConnell, supra note 39, at 79–81.
41. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§§ 401(e), 440(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1268, 1276 (previously codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)).
42. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, div. C, § 306, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-607 to 3009-12 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(1)).
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provision for noncitizens deportable on criminal grounds and added another
jurisdictional bar for most discretionary decisions of the attorney general.43
Finally, the IIRIRA stated that the new section 242 procedures were the
exclusive means of challenging removal orders, explicitly excluding the
general habeas jurisdiction under § 2241.44 These provisions could be read
to exclude noncitizens deportable on criminal grounds from seeking any
judicial relief, but the Supreme Court instead held that habeas relief for
constitutional claims and pure questions of law remained available.45 In the
REAL ID Act of 2005, Congress amended § 1252 again and directed all
challenges to removal orders to the courts of appeal.46
While congressionally authorized judicial review is a relatively recent
development, the use of habeas corpus in immigration cases dates from as
early as the nineteenth century, and these early decisions articulated
foundational principles that influenced the development of both immigration
and habeas law.47 A pair of cases from the late 1800s involved the use of
habeas to challenge the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which prohibited
nearly all immigration from China and created several administrative
requirements, such as obtaining a certificate, for those who were already
settled in the United States.48 The first case, Chae Chan Ping v. United
States,49 involved a Chinese individual who obtained the certificate and then
temporarily returned to China during which time Congress changed the law
to bar such individuals.50 The Court determined that the statute barring the
return of individuals with certificates was constitutional and that any relief
lay only with the executive branch.51 Ping marked a critical jurisprudential
development in immigration law articulating the “plenary power” doctrine
that limits Article III–enforced constitutional protections to this day.52
However, seven years later, in Wong Wing v. United States,53 the Court
found a provision of an immigration statute unconstitutional for the first
time.54 In Wong Wing, four noncitizens were adjudged guilty of violating

43. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)–(C).
44. Id. § 1252(g).
45. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300 (2001).
46. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, § 106(a), 119 Stat. 302, 310
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252).
47. See generally, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 709 (1893); Ekiu
v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889);
United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621 (1888).
48. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Pub. L. No. 47-126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943); see
also Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese
Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 856 n.12 (1987).
49. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
50. Id. at 582.
51. Id. at 606.
52. See David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention,
51 EMORY L.J. 1003, 1015–16 (2002); Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of
Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM.
L. REV. 1625, 1633–34 (1992).
53. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
54. Id. at 238.
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the Chinese Exclusion Act in a summary proceeding before a commissioner
(i.e., an early type of administrative law judge).55 These individuals filed
habeas petitions challenging the statute’s imposition of a punishment of
imprisonment at hard labor.56 The Court held that the noncitizens’
imprisonment was sufficiently similar to a criminal punishment such that it
warranted the protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.57
Habeas continues to provide noncitizens with an avenue for judicial review
of executive action.58 For example, in Zadvydas v. Davis,59 the Court held
that noncitizens could not be detained indefinitely by ICE pending their
deportations.60 The Court also recognized that noncitizens may use habeas
to challenge the constitutionality of the statute authorizing their detention
without bail in Demore v. Kim.61 And the Ninth Circuit and other lower
courts have navigated this precedent to hold, for example, that a bond hearing
is required once an appeal is pending with the circuit court notwithstanding
the application of section 236(a).62
Further highlighting the ongoing weight of the writ, when the COVID-19
pandemic struck, a number of noncitizens filed successful habeas petitions to
escape unsafe detention conditions.63 In the Southern District of New York,
while awaiting removal, four noncitizens were being detained by ICE in
county jails where the COVID-19 virus had been detected.64 Each of the
petitioners had chronic medical conditions—such as asthma, diminished lung
capacity, diabetes, and compromised immune systems—that put them at risk
of injury or death if exposed to the virus.65 The district court noted that
habeas challenges to conditions posing medical threats to detainees were

55. Id. at 229.
56. Id. at 234–35.
57. Id. at 236–38; see also Cole, supra note 52, at 1016 (commenting on case); Karen
Nelson Moore, Aliens and the Constitution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 801, 825 (2013) (same).
58. See Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 962 (2019) (reiterating the availability of habeas
corpus despite attempts to strip courts of jurisdiction in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(e), 1252(b)(9));
Sayed, supra note 14, at 1851–52.
59. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
60. Id. at 701.
61. 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003) (“Section 1226(e) contains no explicit provision barring
habeas review, and we think that its clear text does not bar respondent’s constitutional
challenge to the legislation authorizing his detention without bail.”); see also Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841 (2018).
62. See Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 949 (9th Cir. 2008).
63. See, e.g., Valenzuela Arias v. Decker, No. 20–2802, 2020 WL 1847986, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2020); Ferreyra v. Decker, 456 F. Supp. 3d 538, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)
(ordering release of at-risk detainees). But see Singh v. Hoover, No. 20-00627, 2020 WL
1904470, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2020) (denying motion for release). There are numerous
other important examples of how noncitizens’ use of habeas beyond the pure immigration
context is also a driver of significant jurisprudence. In 2008, the Supreme Court decided
Boumediene v. Bush, holding that the Suspension Clause applied to the noncitizen enemy
combatants held at Guantanamo Bay and that these detainees had a constitutional right to
challenge the factual basis for their detention. 553 U.S. 723, 733, 771 (2008); see also Moore,
supra note 57, at 869–70 (discussing case).
64. Ferreyra, 456 F. Supp. 3d at 542.
65. Id.
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properly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.66 And, in assessing the merits, the
district court found that the petitioners had demonstrated a danger of
irreparable harm, a likelihood of success on the merits, and a balance of
equities that tipped in their favor.67
B. Availability of Attorneys’ Fees
While judicial review through habeas corpus petitions is itself a vital
protection for noncitizens facing removal, habeas is also intertwined with a
second procedural safeguard: the availability of attorneys’ fees under the
EAJA. Section 292 of the INA permits noncitizens facing removal to be
assisted by counsel but explicitly requires that the “privilege” of
representation come at “no expense to the Government.”68 This statutory
provision, though, does not categorically bar the payment of attorneys’ fees
under the EAJA.69 But when a noncitizen challenges removal, attorneys’
fees are not available until the noncitizen prevails in an Article III
proceeding, not just an administrative hearing.70 Thus, habeas is one of the
main ways noncitizen plaintiffs and their lawyers are financially incentivized
to challenge potential legislative or executive overreach.71
A “bedrock principle” when considering attorneys’ fees is the “American
Rule,” which requires litigants to cover their own legal expenses, regardless
of whether they win or lose.72 The American Rule goes back more than
two-hundred years,73 and the tradition carries with it a strong presumption
against deviation.74 The Supreme Court has consistently recognized
departures only when either a long-standing common-law exception or
explicit statutory provision so provides. To illustrate the former, the
American Rule does not prevent courts from awarding attorneys’ fees as a
sanction for “willful disobedience of a court order” or as a sanction “when
66. Id. at 549–50.
67. Id. at 545–50.
68. 8 U.S.C. § 1362; see also Shani M. King & Nicole Silvestri Hall, Unaccompanied
Minors, Statutory Interpretation, and Due Process, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2020)
(discussing the limits of Section 292).
69. See Ardestani v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 502 U.S. 129, 139 (1991) (noting
that it did not reach the question as to whether section 292 of the INA bars the payment of
attorneys’ fees under the EAJA).
70. Compare Implementation of the Equal Access to Justice Act in Department of Justice
Administrative Proceedings, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,921 (Oct. 5, 1981) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 24)
(excluding deportation and exclusion hearings from the coverage of EAJA), and Ardestani,
502 U.S. at 129 (confirming that deportation proceedings before the administrative bodies do
not qualify as adversary adjudications under the EAJA), with Vacchio v. Ashcroft, 404 F.3d
663, 665 (2d Cir. 2005) (awarding fees in habeas immigration proceeding).
71. See generally Prerna Lal & Mindy Phillips, Discover Our Model: The Critical Need
for School-Based Immigration Legal Services, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 577, 590–91 (2018)
(“[P]aying for clients’ immigration application fees also gives an incentive for people to come
in for an initial consultation with an attorney and walk out with a comprehensive plan for their
cases.”); Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1,
11 (1984); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 396–97, 441–42 (1982).
72. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 252–53 (2010).
73. See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
74. See Baker Botts v. ASARCO, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2164 (2015).
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the losing party has ‘acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons.’”75 To the latter, more than 150 federal statutes permit
the award of attorneys’ fees, most predicated on the party achieving some
degree of success.76
Some of these issue-specific fee-shifting statutes may happen to apply in
immigration proceedings. For example, in a political asylum case, the
asylum seeker brought an action under the Freedom of Information Act77
(FOIA) for documents relating to his immigration proceedings.78 After
prevailing, the asylum seeker was awarded attorneys’ fees and costs for the
FOIA litigation as a prevailing party.79 But the EAJA is the fee-shifting
statute that applies most broadly—albeit, with significant limitations—to
proceedings in which the issue in dispute is substantively about
immigration.80
The EAJA arose, in part, as a response to the American Rule and the need
to promote private enforcement of civil rights.81 It has long been recognized
as an example of a statutory exception about which “there could be little
dispute that [the] provision . . . trumps the American Rule.”82 The EAJA’s
waiver of sovereign immunity was part of a trend in which the federal
government “gradually lowered the shield of sovereign immunity and made
itself increasingly amenable to awards of attorney’s fees to those who
succeed in specific types of litigation against the government.”83 For
example, as far back as 1948, Congress partially waived sovereign immunity
by making the United States liable for fees and costs when expressly
provided for by an act of Congress.84 Congress reaffirmed this waiver in
1966 when it amended the predecessor statute to the EAJA.85 And, after the
Supreme Court rejected a judicial expansion of fee shifting in Alyeska

75. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 557 (2014)
(quoting Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 258–59 (1975)).
76. See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 684 (1983).
77. 5 U.S.C. § 552.
78. Jarno v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 365 F. Supp. 2d 733, 736 (E.D. Va. 2005).
79. Id. at 741.
80. Illustrating its importance, a number of high-profile immigration practice guides
discuss the EAJA. See, e.g., Off. of Staff Att’ys, Ninth Circuit Immigration Outline,
U.S.
CTS.
NINTH
CIR.,
https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/guides/
FOR
THE
immigration_outline.php [https://perma.cc/CPF7-48DR] (Feb. 2021); TRINA REALMUTO &
STACY TOLCHIN, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL & NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWS.
GUILD, REQUESTING ATTORNEYS’ FEES UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT (2014),
https://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/PDFs/practitioners/practice_advisories/fed/201
4_17Jun_eaja.pdf [https://perma.cc/KCE8-3NC4].
81. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 445–46 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
82. See Baker Botts v. ASARCO, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2164 (2015) (quoting Comm’r v. Jean,
496 U.S. 154, 161 (1990)).
83. See Gregory C. Sisk, The Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards
of Attorney’s Fees for Unreasonable Government Conduct (Part One), 55 LA. L. REV. 217,
221 (1994).
84. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 2412, 62 Stat. 869, 973.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a).
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Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,86 Congress responded by passing
statutes that permitted fee shifting in civil rights cases, including the Civil
Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976.87
In 1980, Congress passed the EAJA as a rider to a bill providing assistance
to small businesses.88 The rider was added to respond to concerns that small
businesses were being targeted by regulatory agencies because they lacked
the funds to litigate the issues.89 Thus, the EAJA provided for the award of
attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties in civil actions brought by or against the
United States, a broad waiver of sovereign immunity and a statutory
exception to the “American Rule” described above.90
Notwithstanding this particular focus, the EAJA’s scope was not limited
just to small businesses.91 Instead, it imposed a few limits—such as a net
worth cap—but reached most individual and corporate litigants who might
contest unreasonable government action if not deterred by the financial
costs.92
The EAJA’s original passage contained a three-year sunset provision.93
Shortly after the expiration of its trial period, Congress enacted a permanent
version.94 By extending the EAJA indefinitely, Congress tried to ensure that
private individuals, corporations, and organizations would “not be deterred
from seeking review of, or defending against, unjustified governmental
action because of the expense involved.”95 This objective was intertwined
with the policy goal of deterring the unreasonable exercise of government
authority.96
While not explicitly stated in the legislative history,
commentators have observed that compensating wronged parties is another
goal of the EAJA.97
The EAJA seeks to effectuate these goals by providing for fee shifting in
three distinct circumstances. One provision simply puts the United States on
86. 421 U.S. 240, 263 (1975).
87. Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, §2, 90 Stat.
2641, 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)); see also Sisk, supra note 83, at 221 (citing
Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on Awards of Attorney’s Fees Against the Federal Government, 25
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 733, 735–36 (1993)).
88. Sisk, supra note 83, at 222.
89. Id. (first citing H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 10 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4984, 4988; and then citing S. REP. NO. 96-253, at 7 (1979)).
90. Id. at 220; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
91. Sisk, supra note 83, at 222 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1988)) (defining the
term “party” as used in the EAJA).
92. Id.; see also Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 883 (1989).
93. Sisk, supra note 83, at 222 (citing Act of Oct. 21, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II,
§ 204(c), 94 Stat. 2325, 2329 (lapsed)).
94. Id.
95. H.R. REP. NO. 99-120, at 4 (1985).
96. Ardestani v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 502 U.S. 129, 138 (1991).
97. See Harold J. Krent, Fee Shifting Under the Equal Access to Justice Act—A Qualified
Success, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 458, 478 (1993); Sisk, supra note 83, at 226; see also
Berman v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 1290, 1295 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[I]t has been suggested that the
EAJA was intended to compensate parties for expenses incurred in defending against
unreasonable government action—a purpose which arguably is distinct from mitigating the
deterrent effect of litigating.”).
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equal footing with private litigants by making the federal government liable
for attorneys’ fees under the general, existing common-law and statutory
exceptions to the American Rule.98 Another provision, section 504(a),
permits the award of attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties in adversarial
administrative adjudications.99 The EAJA also created a new right to
attorneys’ fees, requiring fee shifting when an eligible party—whether
plaintiff or defendant—prevails in a non-tort civil action brought in any court
with jurisdiction against the federal government in which the government’s
position was not substantially justified.100
Section 504(a)(1) would, on its face, seem to apply to immigration
proceedings. The DOJ regulations, however, exclude removal proceedings
before the administrative bodies from the coverage of EAJA.101 In Ardestani
v. INS,102 the Court took up the question of whether a noncitizen who
prevailed in administrative deportation proceedings was entitled to attorneys’
fees under section 504(a)(1).103 The Court reasoned that the hearing was not
an “adversary adjudication” because the EAJA defined the term, in relevant
part, as “an adjudication under section 554,” which only covers hearings
governed by the APA.104 The Court agreed that the purposes of the EAJA
would be served by extending it to the removal proceedings but held that it
“cannot extend the EAJA to administrative deportation proceedings when the
plain language of the statute, coupled with the strict construction of waivers
of sovereign immunity, constrain us to do otherwise.”105 With the Ardestani
ruling, § 2412(d)(1)(A)—authorizing the award of attorneys’ fees for
prevailing parties’ non-tort civil actions brought in any court with jurisdiction
against the federal government and where the government’s position was not
substantially justified—takes on an even more important role in ensuring the
availability of counsel and the protection of the rights of noncitizens facing
removal.106
While there are many rationales for fee shifting,107 the most directly
applicable to the EAJA’s fee-shifting provisions as seen in the immigration
habeas context is the “private attorney general” theory, which rewards
private litigants for bringing successful lawsuits that further the public

98. See Sisk, supra note 83, at 223 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b)).
99. See id. at 224–25 (discussing 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1)).
100. See id. at 223–24 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)). For further details, in two articles
published in the Louisiana Law Review, Sisk expertly covers each element of this fee-shifting
provision. See id. passim; Gregory C. Sisk, The Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act:
Court Awards of Attorney’s Fees for Unreasonable Government Conduct (Part Two), 56 LA.
L. REV. 1 passim (1995).
101. 46 Fed. Reg. 48,921 (Oct. 5, 1981) (excluding deportation and exclusion hearings
from the coverage of EAJA).
102. 502 U.S. 129, 131 (1991).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 132–33.
105. Id. at 138.
106. See, e.g., Vacchio v. Ashcroft, 404 F.3d 663, 663 (2d Cir. 2005).
107. Thomas Rowe has identified six rationales for fee shifting. Thomas D. Rowe, The
Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 653–66.
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interest.108 At first glance, an individual’s habeas petition challenging
conditions of detention while awaiting removal might not obviously
implicate the public interest warranting an award of attorneys’ fees. But,
under the EAJA, attorneys’ fees are only available if the government’s
position lacked a “substantial justification,” which suggests that either there
was outlier misconduct or larger legal issues were at stake.109 This rationale
suggests, as a theoretical matter, that the availability of fees will encourage
attorneys to push forward the public interests at stake with immigration
habeas cases.
While the empirical literature on the EAJA and related statutes is sparse
and does not lend itself to making bold causal claims at a granular level, on
balance, the body of evidence suggests that the EAJA’s fee-shifting
provisions incentivize individual claims with limited monetary value.110 The
growth of private federal statutory enforcement legislation followed the
expansion of fee-shifting provisions in “strikingly close association,” which
suggested “the efficacy of private enforcement regimes in mobilizing private
litigants.”111 As Pamela S. Karlan succinctly summarized, “Attorney’s fees
are the fuel that drives the private attorney general engine.”112
More generally, Congress has frequently used fee-shifting provisions to
enforce federal laws promoting civil rights.113 Fee shifting is a necessary

108. See John P. Stern, Applying the Equal Access to Justice Act to Asylum Hearings, 97
YALE L.J. 1459, 1462 n.26 (1988); see also Thomas W. Holm, Aliens’ Alienation from Justice:
The Equal Access to Justice Act Should Apply to Deportation Proceedings, 75 MINN. L. REV.
1185, 1215 (1991); John J. Sullivan, The Equal Access to Justice Act in the Federal Courts,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 1089, 1093 (1984).
109. See generally Krent, supra note 97, at 458 n.3 (discussing legislative history of EAJA,
including how it was partially a response to a limitation on court-awarded fees in private
attorneys general cases); see also H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 9 (1979), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 4987.
110. See Susan M. Olson, How Much Access to Justice from State “Equal Access to Justice
Acts”?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 547, 549 (1995) (“The study finds that EAJAs have produced
a rather modest degree of redistribution of resources from the government to private parties.”);
Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The
Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
719, 756–59 (1988) (finding no conclusive evidence of increased filing rates).
111. BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 10, at 14–15.
112. Karlan, supra note 10, at 205; see also Comm’r, Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v.
Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 163 (1990) (“[T]he specific purpose of the EAJA is to eliminate for the
average person the financial disincentive to challenge unreasonable governmental actions.”);
Kevin R. Johnson, Responding to the “Litigation Explosion”: The Plain Meaning of
Executive Branch Primacy over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REV. 413, 486 (1993); Alix Langone,
This Nonprofit Just Got $20 Million to Help Immigrants Detained at the Border—But It’s Still
Not Enough, MONEY (Jun. 26, 2018, 2:32 PM), https://money.com/texas-raices-fundraisermoney/ [https://perma.cc/J6YM-X9BV].
113. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401–02 (1968) (“A Title
II [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] suit is thus private in form only. When a plaintiff brings
an action under that Title, he cannot recover damages. If he obtains an injunction, he does so
not for himself alone but also as a ‘private attorney general,’ vindicating a policy that Congress
considered of the highest priority.”); see also Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in the Right
for Civil Rights: The Supreme Court, Congress, and Statutory Fees, 69 TEX. L. REV. 291, 302
(1990); David L. Noll, Regulating Arbitration, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 985, 989 (2017) (“The
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element of enforcing civil rights because the expense of litigation—in
conjunction with the American Rule—may otherwise discourage attorneys
from bringing meritorious cases where damages are low or nonmonetary
relief is sought.114 Congress has used it for 150 years, initially providing for
fee shifting in voting rights cases as part of the Enforcement Act of 1870.115
In fact, all major federal civil rights laws enacted since 1964 have included a
fee-shifting provision.116
C. The Need for a Judicial Backstop in a Time of Aggressive Enforcement
Losing the judicial backstop to executive and legislative overreach would
especially harm noncitizen detainees during a time when ICE has been
aggressively pursuing removal.117 While running for president, Donald J.
Trump raised concerns about a lack of enforcement in immigration policies
that he perceived as permitting “thousands of criminal aliens to freely roam
our streets, walk around, do whatever they want to do, [commit] crime all
over the place.”118 And, once ensconced in office, the Trump administration
aggressively pursued policies to detain and remove noncitizens who had been
charged with any criminal offense.119 While the rates leveled off in 2019
because of a perceived need to divert resources toward border
enforcement,120 the number of administrative arrests rose by 44 percent from

starting point is to appreciate the extent of Congress’s reliance on private civil litigation to
implement federal law.”).
114. BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 10, at 8.
115. Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, §§ 2–4, 16 Stat. 140, 141; Armand Derfner,
Background and Origin of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee Awards Act of 1976, 37 URB. LAW.
653, 654 (2005); William H. Fedullo, Classless and Uncivil: The Three-Decade Legacy of
Evans v. Jeff D., 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1349, 1352 (2019).
116. Zarcone v. Perry, 438 F. Supp. 788, 793 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff’d, 581 F.2d 1039
(2d Cir. 1978) (first citing Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c);
then citing Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617; then citing Equal
Employment Amendments of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b); and then citing Voting Rights
Act Extension of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e)); see also Karlan, supra note 10, at 205.
117. See, e.g., Michael K.T. Tan & Michael Kaufman, Jailing the Immigrant Poor:
Hernandez v. Sessions, 21 CUNY L. REV. 69, 87 (2017).
118. See, e.g., Kate Evans, Immigration Detainers, Local Discretion, and State Law’s
Historical Constraints, 84 BROOK. L. REV. 1085, 1085 n.2 (2019) (quoting Transcript:
Donald Trump’s Full Immigration Speech, Annotated, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2016, 9:35 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-donald-trump-immigration-speech-transcript20160831-snap-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/95FZ-59N9])).
119. Jason A. Cade, Sanctuaries as Equitable Delegation in an Era of Mass Immigration
Enforcement, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 433, 436 (2018) (“When the Trump Administration came to
power early in 2017, it quickly made every potentially deportable noncitizen a removal
priority.”) (citing Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, Exec. Order
No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 30, 2017))); id. at 436 n.8 (“It is the policy of the executive
branch to . . . detain individuals apprehended on suspicion of violating Federal or State
law . . . .” (quoting Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, 82 Fed.
Reg. at 8793–94)); see also Dean DeChiaro, DHS Rolls Back Obama-Era Deportation
Priorities, Will Target All Criminals, CQ ROLL CALL, Feb. 21, 2017, 2017 WL 675880.
120. 2019 ICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 3. In this same vein, although deportation is the
focus of most immigration policy debates, it is just a part of what ICE does. See Eisha Jain,
The Interior Structure of Immigration Enforcement, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1463, 1464 (2019).
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2016 to 2018.121 The arrest rates of noncitizens with pending criminal
charges rose from 6267 to 32,977 over that same time—a 426 percent
increase.122 Similarly, the number of removals has rapidly grown. Between
2017 and 2019, the number of removals rose from 226,119 to 267,258.123
And, here too, the highest rate of growth—44 percent—accompanied
individuals who had pending criminal charges.124 It is unclear that a change
in the administration will either reduce the rate of new enforcement or
address those already caught in the system.125
Moreover, even as the number of individuals detained and removed
climbs, ICE has been beset by reports of misconduct, including the use of
highly questionable tactics.126 For example, ICE created a fake university as
part of a sting operation.127 And the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the
unsafe medical conditions endemic throughout detention facilities.128
In the face of ICE’s aggression, counsel for detained noncitizens facing
removal acts as a necessary counterbalance.129 Without counsel, noncitizen
detainees win their cases at a rate that is ten times less than that of their

121. U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FISCAL YEAR 2018 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND
REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 3 (2018), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/
eroFY2018Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9V5G-AYWQ].
122. Id. at 3.
123. 2019 ICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 19.
124. Id.
125. The 2021 statistics have yet to be released, so it remains unclear how the Biden
administration’s approach might differ. The 2020 statistics do already show a significant drop
in removals but that was related to the pandemic. See U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FISCAL
YEAR 2020 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 18–19 (2020),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/reports/annual-report/eroReportFY2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TY3X-PQ42].
126. See, e.g., Charles Lane, ICE Failed to Hold Detention Center Contractors
Accountable, Report Finds, NPR (Feb. 1, 2019, 3:59 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/
01/690690056/ice-failed-to-hold-detention-center-contractors-accountable-report-finds
[https://perma.cc/CJ6T-2TCA]; see also OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., DHS NEEDS TO IMPROVE
ITS OVERSIGHT OF MISCONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE (2019), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/assets/2019-06/OIG-19-48-Jun19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DRH5-JV2L];
Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention?: Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of
Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1615–16 (2010).
127. Niraj Warikoo, ICE and DOJ Defend Creating Fake University in Michigan, Some
Question Tactics Used by Feds in Sting, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Dec. 9, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2019/12/09/ice-defends-fake-universitymetro-detroit-led-250-arrests/2625316001/ [https://perma.cc/G6P8-LV6H].
128. See, e.g., supra note 63 (discussing Valenzuela Arias and other cases); see also Emily
Ryo, Introduction to the Special Issue on Immigration Detention, 54 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 750,
751 (2020) (“As the COVID-19 pandemic engulfed the nation in the spring and summer of
2020, jails, prisons, and detention facilities became a tinderbox of infection.”).
129. Kevin Gardner, Prisoners in the Face of Gladiators: Providing a Sword and Shield
to Aliens in Removal Proceedings Through Court-Appointed Counsel, 52 AKRON L. REV.
1189, 1205 (2018) (“[C]ourt-appointed counsel would protect U.S. citizens from unlawful
removal, thus providing a counterweight to aggressive enforcement of immigration laws.”);
David Hausman, The Failure of Immigration Appeals, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1177, 1213 (2016)
(explaining need for government-appointed counsel for immigrants in removal proceedings
because immigration judges can—and do—influence whether detained immigrants can even
find and retain counsel privately, which limits efficacy of appeals).
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represented counterparts.130 And, again, it is the availability of attorneys’
fees under the EAJA that incentivizes lawyers to take these cases.131
II. CASE STUDY OF RETRENCHMENT
The attempts to establish that the EAJA’s use of the term “civil action”
does not include immigration habeas are best understood as an example of
rights retrenchment.
This part begins by summarizing the rights
retrenchment movement and identifying how it has pushed back on both
noncitizens’ use of courts and the availability of fees to promote civil rights
litigation. It then details how traditional statutory interpretation tools support
the conclusion that the EAJA’s use of the term “civil action” is meant to
encompass habeas proceedings. One implication of this analysis is that
something other than the formal legal reasoning must be driving the attack
on the availability of fees—and that something is rights retrenchment. This
part uses this example to draw further conclusions about rights retrenchment
more generally, including how agency nonacquiescence can be used to push
back against the enforcement of civil rights.
A. Rights Retrenchment Background
Professors Steven Burbank and Sean Farhang have detailed how the
conservative legal movement responded to the civil rights legislation of the
1960s and 1970s by using the federal courts—and the Supreme Court,
especially—to create new procedural barriers to the private enforcement
mechanisms.132 Their study of 369 cases between 1960 and 2014 show a
substantial decline in plaintiffs’ probability of success in cases involving
procedures that either enhanced or hampered the incentives and access of
private litigants to enforce civil rights.133 By 2014, in cases involving a
divided court, the private enforcement side lost about five times more than
they won.134 Burbank and Farhang further observed that ideological
polarization over procedural rules was even greater than that over the
underlying substantive rights.135
Among the various institutional actors—Congress, the courts, and the rules
committee—who have been part of the rights retrenchment movement, the

130. Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in
Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 50 (2015). While this study looks at the
administrative proceedings, as discussed later, the same features are seen in habeas.
131. See Krent, supra note 97, at 495; Michael J. Mortimer & Robert W. Malmsheimer,
The Equal Access to Justice Act and US Forest Service Land Management: Incentives to
Litigate?, 109 J. FORESTRY 352, 357 (2011).
132. See generally BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 10; see also Karlan, supra note 10,
at 185 (“The other approach, which is more insidious, is for the court to leave the formal right
in place, but to constrict the remedial machinery. At best, this will dilute the value of the right,
since some violations will go unremedied.”).
133. Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Rights and Retrenchment in the Trump Era, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 59 (2018).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 60.
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Supreme Court has been the most effective.136 Procedural issues are rarely
of high salience for the general public and, therefore, go unnoticed.137
Moreover, the federal bench is politically insulated from any public
dissatisfaction that might arise.138 Without any meaningful popular support
or public oversight, the judiciary’s creation of procedural barriers to the
private enforcement of civil rights is a concerning exercise of
counter-majoritarian power.139
Another reason that the Supreme Court has been so effective is that, in the
federal system, trial and intermediate appellate courts tend to be its faithful
agents. The lower courts are sensitive to the reputational and workload
damage accompanying reversal.140 Also, no matter what the reasoning, as a
descriptive matter, lower courts exhibit a responsiveness to the perceived
ideological trends and preferences of the Supreme Court.141 And there is
plenty for the lower courts to respond to when it comes to both fee shifting
and the rights of noncitizens.
A particularly apt example of retrenchment in fee shifting is Buckhannon
Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human
Resources.142 There, the Supreme Court narrowly construed the term
“prevailing party” to mean only those litigants who achieved a court-ordered
change, even if the litigation prompted the requested change.143 By limiting
the award of fees to such circumstances, the Court created incentives for civil
rights lawyers (to take one example) to choose lawsuits in which damages
are available and, thus, are not as susceptible to strategic mooting.144

136. Id. at 60–62.
137. BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 10, at 201–04.
138. Burbank & Farhang, supra note 133, at 61.
139. See generally ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962) (“The
root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system.”). Even in
the wake of mass protests of police brutality that sparked legislative action in Colorado, the
Supreme Court declined to take up the issue of qualified immunity. See Hailey Fuchs,
Qualified Immunity Protection for Police Emerges as Flash Point amid Protests, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 18, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/23/us/politics/qualified-immunity.html
[https://perma.cc/62VY-JAYQ].
140. See Kevin T. McGuire et al., Measuring Policy Content on the U.S. Supreme Court,
71 J. POL. 1305, 1307 (2009).
141. See David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Explanation of Lower
Court Compliance, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 579, 579 (2003) (“For the most part, lower court
judges tend to follow specific higher court precedents, and their decisions generally track
ideological trends in the higher court.”); Brian J. Broughman & Deborah A. Widiss, After the
Override: An Empirical Analysis of Shadow Precedent, 46 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 53 (2017)
(suggesting judges have a “preference for reducing the risk of reversal by deciding cases in
line with the Supreme Court’s presumed preferences”).
142. 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
143. Id. at 609; see also Karlan, supra note 10, at 206 (“Buckhannon Board & Care Home,
Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources marked yet a further
retrenchment.”); Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating
Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA.
L. REV. 2119, 2139 (2000).
144. Karlan, supra note 10, at 207–09.
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As to noncitizens’ rights, in Hernandez v. Mesa,145 the Supreme Court
questioned whether a Bivens action could be brought against a CBP officer
who shot across the border and killed a Mexican teenager.146 On remand,
the Fifth Circuit responded to the Supreme Court’s signaling, holding that
the Bivens action could not be brought because of concerns about foreign
relations with Mexico even though Mexico had filed a brief in support of the
murdered teenager’s family.147
Even more closely related to the attack on fees in immigration habeas, the
Supreme Court’s holding that the EAJA did not apply to deportation hearings
before an administrative judge has been characterized by a leading
immigration and federal courts scholar as part of the then Rehnquist Court’s
reform efforts to discourage civil rights litigation.148 And, before joining the
Supreme Court, Chief Justice Roberts proposed a bill to slash the availability
of attorneys’ fees for just these sorts of cases.149 Even if the district and
circuit court judges are not consciously molding their orders to conform to
this signaling, the rights retrenchment movement is a part of the background
context in which they are making their decisions.
B. ICE’s Attack on Attorneys’ Fees in Habeas Proceedings
In the context of immigration removal proceedings, the availability of
attorneys’ fees through the EAJA is a critical incentive to ensuring that all
individuals, citizen and noncitizen alike, have their habeas rights
respected.150 Accordingly, whether intended or not, reading habeas
proceedings out of the EAJA looks very much like another example of rights

145. 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017).
146. Id. at 2008; see also James E. Pfander & Wade Formo, The Past and Future of
Equitable Remedies: An Essay for Frank Johnson, 71 ALA. L. REV. 723, 747 (2020)
(“Confirming its distaste for legal remediation, the Court embraced a trend in the lower courts
that views gratuitous payments to foreign nationals injured by government actions abroad as
justifying the denial of any right to sue for damages.”); James E. Pfander, Alexander A.
Reinert & Joanna C. Schwartz, The Myth of Personal Liability: Who Pays When Bivens
Claims Succeed, 72 STAN. L. REV. 561, 563 (2020) (“Reflected in the Court’s 2017 decision
in Ziglar v. Abbasi, and echoed more recently in Hernandez v. Mesa, such worries about
official liability have fueled an expansion of immunity defenses, as well as a growing hostility
to the recognition of any right to sue under the Bivens doctrine.”).
147. Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 820 (5th Cir. 2018); see also Louise Weinberg,
Age of Unreason: Rationality and the Regulatory State, 53 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 4–5 n.2
(2019) (identifying this case as failing in its formal logic).
148. See Johnson, supra note 112, at 480 n.329 (“Ardestani is indicative of the Rehnquist
Court’s hostility the toward awarding of attorneys’ fees, a practice designed to encourage
certain types of litigation.”).
149. Burbank & Farhang, supra note 133, at 41 (noting that Roberts stated that “[t]his
legislation will, of course, be opposed by the self-styled public interest bar, but the abuses that
have arisen in the award of attorney’s fees against the government clearly demand remedial
action.”).
150. See Vacchio v. Ashcroft, 404 F.3d 663, 671 (2d Cir. 2005) (“The rationale of
encouraging challenges to improper government action as a means of formulating better public
policy rather than vindicating individual rights is well addressed by applying EAJA to these
particular habeas proceedings.”).
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retrenchment. This impression is heightened when the arguments for and
against such an interpretation are marshalled against each other.
The standard court approach to statutory construction is to begin with the
statutory text and, unless otherwise defined, ascertain the ordinary meaning
of the term at issue.151 Even in Ardestani, the Supreme Court only looked to
the canon of construing waivers of sovereign immunity narrowly after
addressing whether the statutory text was unambiguous.152 The EAJA does
not define the term “civil action” and so the question becomes whether
habeas proceedings are ordinarily understood to be civil or criminal
proceedings. There is little, if any, serious debate that habeas proceedings
are civil actions. Functionally, the writ is sought by individuals against the
government custodian and is not a government-initiated criminal action.153
As the Supreme Court explained in Riddle v. Dyche,154 the “writ of habeas
corpus is not a proceeding in the original criminal prosecution but an
independent civil suit.”155 And, thus, the reasons for the underlying
detention cannot—and should not—change the nature of the writ.156
The Supreme Court has recognized that, even in colonial America, the writ
of habeas corpus was available to individuals who were civilly detained.157
This is a consistent aspect of the historical court practices in the United
States. For example, in 1824, a father sought to free his minor son from the
custody of the child’s grandfather by petitioning for habeas relief.158
The Supreme Court’s older precedent further supports the characterization
of habeas proceedings as civil actions. For example, in 1883, the Court
stated, “the judicial proceeding under [the habeas corpus statute] is not to
inquire into the criminal act which is complained of, but into the right to
liberty notwithstanding the act. Proceedings to enforce civil rights are civil
proceedings.”159 In 1889, the Court described a habeas petition as “a civil
remedy, given in a civil action; as much so as a writ of habeas corpus, which
this court has held to be a civil, and not a criminal, proceeding, even when
instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution.”160 By 1892, the Court’s
jurisprudence regarding the civil nature of habeas was sufficiently

151. See BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91 (2006); see also Blackman v. District
of Columbia, 456 F.3d 167, 176 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (using the same approach in an EAJA case).
152. Ardestani v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 502 U.S. 129, 138 (1991).
153. See FREEDMAN, supra note 24, at 7 (laying out this functional definition of habeas).
154. 262 U.S. 333 (1923).
155. Id. at 336.
156. See Farnsworth v. Montana, 129 U.S. 104, 113 (1889).
157. See Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301–302 (2001); see also
FREEDMAN, supra note 24, at 12–15, 21–22, 40–43 (describing cases from as early as 1714 in
colonial America); Jonathan L. Hafetz, Note, The Untold Story of Noncriminal Habeas Corpus
and the 1996 Immigration Acts, 107 YALE L.J. 2509, 2522–23 (1998).
158. United States v. Green, 26 F. Cas. 30, 31 (C.C.D.R.I. 1824) (No. 15,256).
159. Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 559 (1883).
160. Farnsworth, 129 U.S. at 113; see also Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 494 (1885) (“A
writ of habeas corpus, sued out by one arrested for crime, is a civil suit or proceeding, brought
by him to assert the civil right of personal liberty, against those who are holding him in custody
as a criminal.”).
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established that it was described as “well settled.”161 A year later, the Court
reiterated this position in the immigration context.162
The historical understanding of habeas as a civil proceeding has persisted,
even after the passage of the EAJA in 1980. For example, in Hilton v.
Braunskill,163 the Supreme Court noted that its “decisions have consistently
recognized that habeas corpus proceedings are civil in nature.”164 And, in
more recent vintage, the Supreme Court held that proceedings for
noncriminal immigration detention are “civil, not criminal.”165 Federal
circuit and district courts have acknowledged this trend, consistently holding
that, at minimum, noncriminal petitions for writs of habeas corpus are civil
actions.166 And, in the specific context of the EAJA, several circuit and
district courts have reached the same conclusion.167
On the other hand, when faced with habeas petitions challenging criminal
confinement, the Fourth Circuit and Tenth Circuit followed the same analytic
path to hold that the EAJA did not apply. The Fourth Circuit and Tenth
Circuit both found that fee shifting is not necessary to incentivize challenges
to detention.168 However, the core argument more directly turns on how to
define the use of “civil action” in the EAJA.169 Tellingly, the first decision
in each circuit—Ewing v. Rodgers170 in the Tenth Circuit and O’Brien v.
Moore171 in the Fourth Circuit—involved habeas challenges to criminal
detentions.172 Accordingly, the courts unsurprisingly relied on a case from
the Second Circuit, Boudin v. Thomas,173 which likewise involved a habeas
challenge to a criminal detention.174 Within this context, the Fourth Circuit
161. Cross v. Burke, 146 U.S. 82, 88 (1892).
162. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (“The proceeding
before a United States judge, as provided for in section 6 of the act of 1892, is in no proper
sense a trial and sentence for a crime or offense. It is simply the ascertainment, by appropriate
and lawful means, of the fact whether the conditions exist upon which congress has enacted
that an alien of this class may remain within the country. The order of deportation is not a
punishment for crime.”).
163. 481 U.S. 770 (1987).
164. Id. at 776; see also Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 14 (1992) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (“The availability and scope of habeas corpus have changed over the writ’s long
history, but one thing has remained constant: Habeas corpus is . . . an original civil action.”).
165. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
166. See, e.g., Brown v. Vasquez, 952 F.2d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 1991).
167. See, e.g., Kholyavskiy v. Schlecht, 479 F. Supp. 2d 897, 901 (E.D. Wis. 2007)
(holding that the term “any civil action,” as used in the EAJA, is unambiguous and includes
noncriminal habeas petition); Toutounjian v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 2 F. Supp. 2d
374, 376–77 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that fees are available in habeas corpus proceedings
seeking review of an immigration decision, but ultimately denying the award on other
grounds). But see Al-Shewailey v. Mukasey, No. CIV-07-1392, 2008 WL 542956, at *2
(W.D. Okla. Feb. 25, 2008).
168. See Ewing v. Rodgers, 826 F.2d 967, 971 n.5 (10th Cir. 1987); O’Brien v. Moore, 395
F.3d 499, 507 (4th Cir. 2005).
169. See Ewing, 826 F.2d at 969; O’Brien, 395 F.3d at 500–01.
170. 826 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1987).
171. 395 F.3d 499 (4th Cir. 2005).
172. See Ewing, 826 F.2d at 968; O’Brien, 395 F.3d at 500.
173. 732 F.2d 1107 (2d Cir. 1984).
174. See Ewing, 826 F.2d at 969; O’Brien, 395 F.3d at 507.
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and the Tenth Circuit naturally found that habeas is not always considered
solely “civil” but can also have criminal qualities.175 The Fourth Circuit and
the Tenth Circuit then highlighted how waivers of sovereign immunity are to
be construed narrowly.176 Putting these factors together, both circuits held
that the EAJA’s use of the term “civil action” did not unambiguously cover
habeas because of its “hybrid” nature.177 In Obando-Segura v. Garland,178
the Fourth Circuit extended this holding in a case involving an immigration
proceeding without offering much additional reasoning other than a seeming
aversion to considering either the EAJA’s legislative history or purpose.179
On the other hand, in Vacchio v. Ashcroft180 and In re Hill,181 the Second
Circuit and the Ninth Circuit, respectively, held that habeas proceedings
challenging immigration detention qualify as civil actions under the
EAJA.182 In doing so, both courts rejected arguments to extend the holding
in Boudin, which had interpreted habeas proceedings challenging criminal
detention as not falling within the scope of the EAJA.183 The circuit courts
determined that the immigration context was different because the
noncitizens were ineligible for government-provided counsel and their legal
claims often presented important policy challenges.184 The Second Circuit
further identified that the EAJA covered actions brought by the government
and, thus, its purpose went beyond just encouraging litigation to reach
compensating parties for government overreach.185 It also distinguished
habeas claims that had “roots” in criminal actions.186
The legislative history and drafting choices of the EAJA further indicate
that its use of the term “civil action” was meant to encompass habeas
proceedings. To the former, in a Senate hearing, the government’s
representative stated that the award of attorneys’ fees would “affect all areas
of Government business,” specifically mentioning “prisoner petitions.”187
Additionally, other aspects of the U.S. Code reflect Congress’s treatment of
habeas as a civil proceeding.188 To the latter, the use of the term “any” to

175. See Ewing, 826 F.2d at 969; O’Brien, 395 F.3d at 505.
176. See Ewing, 826 F.2d at 969; O’Brien, 395 F.3d at 503.
177. See O’Brien, 395 F.3d at 508; Ewing, 826 F.2d at 971; see also Sloan v. Pugh, 351
F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 2003).
178. 999 F.3d 190 (4th Cir. 2021).
179. Id. at 195 (“O’Brien teaches us that habeas proceedings include a ‘criminal aspect’
and ‘a civil aspect.’ . . . And we, like O’Brien, decline to delve into the legislative-purpose
morass.”).
180. 404 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 2005).
181. 775 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1985).
182. See Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 909–10 (9th Cir. 2009); Vacchio, 404 F.3d at
672; In re Hill, 775 F.2d at 1040–41.
183. Vacchio, 404 F.3d at 672; In re Hill, 775 F.2d at 1040–41.
184. Vacchio, 404 F.3d at 669–71; In re Hill, 775 F.2d at 1040–41.
185. Vacchio, 404 F.3d at 670.
186. Id. at 672.
187. Equal Access to Justice Act of 1979, S. 265: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Improvements in Jud. Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 50, 51 (1979).
188. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).
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modify “civil action” suggests a broad construction.189 The explicit
exclusion of tort actions also suggests that Congress was specifically
identifying those civil actions not covered by the EAJA.190
Additionally, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically enfold
habeas proceedings.191 In relevant part, Rule 81 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure states: “These rules apply to proceedings for habeas corpus . . . to
the extent that the practice in those proceedings: (A) is not specified in a
federal statute . . . and (B) has previously conformed to the practice in civil
actions.”192 And, over the years, courts have found that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure apply in certain cases, such as Rule 17(c)’s provision for the
appointment of a guardian ad litem.193 While courts have determined that
not all of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to habeas proceedings,
even those courts uniformly acknowledge its civil nature.194 Moreover, the
inclusion of habeas in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also points us to
Rule 2, which clearly lays out that “[t]here is one form of action—the civil
action.”195
Prudential concerns counsel against reading “civil action” too narrowly
because, by excluding habeas proceedings under the EAJA, the Fourth
Circuit created a significant circuit split and added to litigants’ uncertainty
about a doctrinal question that deals with both immigration and attorneys’
fees.196
The federal courts generally—and the Supreme Court, in particular—have
long been overtaxed by the number of cases being brought.197 Thus, circuit
splits may not be timely resolved by the Supreme Court.198 These splits lead
to federal law being enforced differently based on accidents of geography.199
189. See Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 219 (2007).
190. See Kholyavskiy v. Schlecht, 479 F. Supp. 2d 897, 901 (E.D. Wis. 2007).
191. See Banister v. Davis, 140 S. Ct. 1698, 1705 (2020) (“The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure generally govern habeas proceedings.”).
192. FED. R. CIV. P. 81(a)(4).
193. See Civil Discovery in Habeas Corpus, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1296, 1299 nn.19–22
(1967) (collecting cases, including Smith v. United States, 174 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 1959)).
194. See, e.g., Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr. of Ill., 434 U.S. 257, 269 (1978); Schlanger
v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487, 490 n.4 (1971).
195. FED. R. CIV. P. 2.
196. Compare Obando-Segura v. Garland, 999 F.3d 190, 195 (4th Cir. 2021), with Vacchio
v. Ashcroft, 404 F.3d 663, 668–69 (2d Cir. 2005), and In re Hill, 775 F.2d 1037, 1040–41 (9th
Cir. 1985).
197. See Trevor W. Morrison, Fair Warning and the Retroactive Judicial Expansion of
Federal Criminal Statutes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 455, 514–15 (2001) (describing the growing
problem of unresolved circuit splits as the number of intermediate appellate decisions
proliferates); see also Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action
Fairness Act on the Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 1723, 1726 (2008) (describing “an already overburdened federal judiciary”).
198. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 73, 105 (explaining that the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010), to resolve a circuit split but
also noting that, since deciding Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012), the Court has
opted not to review any more cases that raise the question of federal preemption of state and
local immigration enforcement laws).
199. See Morrison, supra note 197, at 515 (citing THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE
ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 20 (1994) (quoting Establishing

1512

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

Immigration is an area of law constitutionally entrusted to the federal
government, which sets national policy.200 Accordingly, courts have
recognized that “it would be unsound for each of the several Courts of
Appeals to elaborate a potentially nonuniform body of law” because
uniformity is “especially desirable in [immigration] cases.”201 National
policies in the immigration sphere ensure the equal treatment of individuals
regardless of accidents of geography.202 A lack of uniformity seems
particularly unfair when detained noncitizens facing removal may be
transferred across jurisdictions with different substantive laws on such
important issues as what sorts of criminal convictions are grounds for
mandatory deportation.203 Additionally, a uniform policy should lead to
greater efficiency across the administrative functions.204
The Supreme Court has addressed circuit splits over the doctrine
governing attorneys’ fees, noting the importance of preventing uncertainty
that could lead to additional litigation.205
The risks of strategic
forum-shopping also arise when a federal statute’s fee-shifting provisions are
interpreted differently across the circuit courts.206 In another context, when
dealing with multidistrict litigation (also an issue of national scope), federal
judges themselves have expressed a preference for certainty and guidance
about how to handle attorneys’ fees.207

an Intercircuit Panel: Hearings on S. 704 Before the Subcomm. on Cts. of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 147–48 (1985))).
200. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 378 (1971).
201. Jian Hui Shao v. Bd. of Immigr. Appeals, 465 F.3d 497, 502 (2d Cir. 2006); see also
Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 316 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J.,
concurring) (“Instead, the majority has gone out of its way to create a circuit split where none
need exist, see Maj. Op. at 300 n. 4, thereby frustrating the BIA’s uniform enforcement of a
national immigration policy.”).
202. See Fatma Marouf, A Particularly Serious Exception to the Categorical Approach, 97
B.U. L. REV. 1427, 1470 (2017) (noting that resolving a circuit split over the immigration
consequences of a conviction would lead to noncitizens convicted under the same state statute
being treated identically).
203. See Adrienne Pon, Note, Identifying Limits to Immigration Detention Transfers and
Venue, 71 STAN. L. REV. 747, 762 (2019).
204. See, e.g., Voluntary Departure: Effect of a Motion to Reopen or Reconsider or a
Petition for Review, 73 Fed. Reg. 76,927, 76,932 (proposed Dec. 18, 2008) (codified at 8
C.F.R. pt. 1240, 1241) (proposing a national rule because “[t]he divergent practice among the
federal courts of appeals undermines the sound public policy reasons to ‘promote a greater
measure of uniformity and expedition in the administration of the immigration laws’”).
205. See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983) (“A request for attorney’s
fees should not result in a second major litigation.”); Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v.
W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598, 609 (2001) (defining “prevailing party”
as used in fee-shifting statute).
206. See Mark Tannahill, Fee-Shifting Provisions and the Clean Air Act: Should
Financially-Motivated Plaintiffs Be Barred from Recovering Fees?, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
863, 878–79 (2009) (describing the issue of nonuniform fee-shifting law driving litigants’
choices of where to file Clean Air Act claims); see also Seth Katsuya Endo, Should Evidence
of Settlement Negotiations Affect Attorneys’ Fees Awards?, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
417, 418 (2013) (noting the strategic importance of attorneys’ fees within litigation).
207. See Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s
Place in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669, 1706 (2017).
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Disagreement among the intermediate appellate courts can lead to the
regular, considered development of the law. Justice William J. Brennan once
explained that the Supreme Court had an informal policy “of letting tolerable
conflicts go unaddressed until more than two courts of appeals have
considered a question.”208 Such a policy permits questions to “percolate”
and develop in an orderly, considered fashion.209 It also may provide a
record of the consequences of the different decisions.210 Here, however, it
seems unlikely that the EAJA’s use of the term “civil action” as excluding
habeas proceedings presents the sort of difficult, close question of law that is
best served by a leisurely common-law development—and, of course, there
is now a circuit split that brings the issue to the fore.211
C. Agency Nonacquiescence Magnifies Its Structural Power
This case study illuminates a feature of immigration litigation that lends
itself to rights retrenchment: ICE’s practice of nonacquiescence.212
Nonacquiescence is when an agency decides to give a judicial order either
limited or no effect beyond the particular case in which it was issued.213
In United States v. Mendoza,214 the Supreme Court refused to extend the
doctrine of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel from Parklane Hosiery
Co. v. Shore215 to the United States, which gives constitutional cover to the
practice.216 Since then, agencies have taken advantage of this latitude in
myriad ways. Some follow a circuit court’s interpretation only within the
circuit’s territory.217 Others apply a uniform, national policy at the agency
level regardless of the governing circuit’s interpretation.218 Agencies may
208. E. GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 246 (9th ed. 2007) (quoting William
J. Brennan, Jr., Some Thoughts on the Supreme Court’s Workload, 66 JUDICATURE 230, 233
(1983)).
209. See Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term Foreword: The Limits of
Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 65 (1998); see also Samuel Estreicher & John E.
Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court’s Responsibilities: An Empirical Study,
59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 716 (1984).
210. Dorf, supra note 209, at 65.
211. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The National Court of Appeals: An Unwise Proposal, 83
YALE L.J. 883, 898 (1974) (“Many [circuit splits] can be endured and sometimes perhaps
ought to be endured while judges and scholars observe the respective workings out in practice
of the conflicting rules, particularly where the question of law is a close one, to which [a]
confident answer will in any case be impossible.”).
212. See Stuart Woolman, Judicial Review Under Section 106 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act: Only Rich Aliens Need Apply, 22 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 97, 131–34
(1990).
213. See Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325, 1330–31 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (discussing
both intracircuit and intercircuit nonacquiescence by Immigration and Naturalization Services
(INS)), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 498 U.S. 1117 (1991).
214. 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
215. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
216. 464 U.S. at 157–61.
217. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Solicitor General as Mediator Between Court and
Agency, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 185, 223; Woolman, supra note 212, at 132. See generally
Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative
Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989).
218. See Woolman, supra note 212, at 131.
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choose nonacquiescence as a general policy or just as applied to specific
issues.219 They may do so openly or secretly and consistently or on an ad
hoc basis.220 With these various permutations, agency nonacquiescence
presents thorny theoretical issues involving agency capture, separation of
powers, and federalism that are beyond the scope of this Article.221 But the
practical import in this instance is clear: when ICE refuses to acquiesce to
the (currently) uniform circuit-level case law holding that the EAJA includes
immigration habeas, the agency can push for incremental, accretive change
that magnifies the structural power differences between it and noncitizen
detainees.222
Prior to its recent victory in Obando-Segura, ICE primarily cited four
cases—Boudin, Ewing, Sloan v. Pugh,223 and O’Brien—to support its
position that the EAJA does not reach immigration habeas, characterizing the
set of cases as laying out a categorical rule that all habeas proceedings are,
in effect, neither civil nor criminal but some elusive, sui generis other.224
But, again, none of those cases involved a habeas challenge to immigration
detention—instead, all four involved criminal detention.225 In stark contrast,
the applicability of the EAJA to immigration habeas was directly at issue in
In re Hill, Diaz-Magana, and Vacchio, where the circuit courts uniformly
rejected ICE’s position.226
When looking at the overarching timeline of cases, one sees ICE
continually—if at somewhat irregular intervals—pushing to expand the
holdings in Boudin, Ewing, Pugh, and O’Brien while simultaneously
challenging the breadth of the holdings in In re Hill and Vacchio. In 1983,
the Seventh Circuit noted that ICE did not contest that the EAJA applied in
a habeas proceeding in which the petitioners were challenging their detention

219. See Matthew Diller & Alexander A. Reinert, The Second Circuit and Social Justice,
85 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 103–04 (2016) (describing Social Security Administration’s policy
of nonacquiescence in 1980s); Sisk, supra note 100, at 64 (same).
220. See Ross E. Davies, Remedial Nonacquiescence, 89 IOWA L. REV. 65, 100–01 (2003).
221. See, e.g., Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the
Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801
(1990); Nancy M. Modesitt, The Hundred-Years War: The Ongoing Battle Between Courts
and Agencies over the Right to Interpret Federal Law, 74 MO. L. REV. 949, 972 (2009); Burt
Neuborne, The Binding Quality of Supreme Court Precedent, 61 TUL. L. REV. 991 (1987).
222. See Vertex Surgical, Inc. v. Paradigm Biodevices, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 2d 226, 238 n.14
(D. Mass. 2009) (“The principal repeat players in the federal courts, federal government
agencies, have more than adequate opportunities, without resort to questionable vacatur
gambits, for multiple litigation of issues to advance particular views on statutory or
constitutional interpretation.”). See generally Steve Y. Koh, Nonacquiescence in Immigration
Decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 430 (1991) (describing the
particular importance of INS nonacquiescence).
223. 351 F.3d 1319 (10th Cir. 2003).
224. See, e.g., Respondent-Appellee Brief at 8, Diaz-Magana v. Rogers (9th Cir. 1995)
(No. 95-55884), 1995 WL 17069698, at *8.
225. O’Brien v. Moore, 395 F.3d 499, 501 (4th Cir. 2005); Sloan, 351 F.3d at 1319; Ewing
v. Rodgers, 826 F.2d 967, 971 (10th Cir. 1987).
226. Vacchio v. Ashcroft, 404 F.3d 663, 672 (2d Cir. 2005); In re Hill, 775 F.2d 1037,
1040–41 (9th Cir. 1985).
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pending deportation.227 After the Boudin decision was issued in 1984,228
ICE tried to import it over to both the Ninth Circuit and the immigration
context the following year. But, in In re Hill, the Ninth Circuit rejected ICE’s
reading.229 ICE then tried to limit In re Hill to its particular facts—even
within the Ninth Circuit—as seen in its challenge to EAJA fee shifting in
another immigration habeas proceeding the following year in Montero v.
Ilchert.230 The Ninth Circuit, in dicta, again rejected ICE’s position.231
Despite its failure to expand Boudin to immigration in these two cases, the
U.S. government prevailed in holding the line of Boudin (i.e., EAJA does not
reach habeas arising out of criminal detention) in the Tenth Circuit’s Ewing
decision in 1987.232
Challenges to the EAJA’s applicability to immigration habeas arose again
in the mid-1990s. ICE unsuccessfully argued that Boudin foreclosed
application of the EAJA to immigration habeas in Chen v. INS,233 a case in
the Southern District of New York in 1994.234 Two years later, the Ninth
Circuit emphatically rejected ICE’s proposed narrow reading of In re Hill
and expansive reading of Boudin in an immigration habeas case,
Diaz-Magana v. Rogers.235 Two years after that, a federal district court in
the Western District of New York likewise rejected ICE’s arguments that
Boudin and Ewing precluded applying the EAJA to immigration habeas
proceedings.236
All was quiet for another five years. Then, in the lower court proceedings
in Vacchio, ICE again challenged the application of the EAJA to immigration
habeas. This likely was part of the same campaign to limit the EAJA’s reach
as seen in the Pugh litigation that also was briefed in June. The District of
Vermont adopted ICE’s interpretation based on its reading of Boudin.237
Two years later, in O’Brien, the Fourth Circuit relied on a broad reading of
Boudin as having created a categorical carveout.238 Based on this
interpretation, the court agreed with ICE’s interpretation that the EAJA does
not reach habeas proceedings—at least, not habeas proceedings that arise out
of criminal detention.239 A few months later in April, the Second Circuit
reversed the District of Vermont, holding that the EAJA applied to the
227. Ramos v. Haig, 716 F.2d 471, 472–73 (7th Cir. 1983) (affirming denial because
government’s position was substantially justified).
228. ICE lost on the point in the 1982 district court decision. See Boudin v. Thomas, 554
F. Supp. 703, 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d in part, 732 F.2d 1107, 1117 (2d Cir. 1984).
229. In re Hill, 775 F.2d at 1040–41.
230. 780 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1986).
231. Id. at 765.
232. Ewing v. Rodgers, 826 F.2d 967, 971 (10th Cir. 1987).
233. No. 93 Civ. 2108, 1994 WL 9759 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 1994).
234. Id. at *1.
235. 81 F.3d 167 (9th Cir. 1996).
236. Toutounjian v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 2 F. Supp. 2d 374, 375–76 (W.D.N.Y.
1998).
237. Ruling on Petitioner’s Request for Attorney’s Fees and Costs, Vacchio v. Ashcroft,
No. 02-cv-00293 (D. Vt. July 31, 2003), ECF No. 24.
238. O’Brien v. Moore, 395 F.3d 499, 501 (4th Cir. 2005).
239. Id.
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immigration habeas proceeding and rejecting the broad reading of Boudin
adopted by the Fourth Circuit and Tenth Circuit.240 A few months after the
Second Circuit’s decision, ICE declined to raise the argument before the
District of Connecticut,241 which then noted the Vacchio decision in its final
order.242 In 2006, ICE tried to import an expansive reading of the O’Brien
holding to the Eastern District of Wisconsin in an immigration habeas
proceeding.243 A federal district court in the Eastern District of Wisconsin
rejected ICE’s proposed readings of O’Brien and Ewing, relying on Vacchio,
which described a habeas action challenging detention by ICE as “both a civil
action in its own right . . . and ha[ving] its roots in a civil action.”244 But, in
2008, despite neither party briefing the issue, a federal district court in the
Western District of Oklahoma cited Pugh for the proposition that the EAJA
did not reach immigration habeas proceedings.245
The next indication that ICE had not finished its efforts to establish that
the EAJA does not reach immigration habeas came in 2017. In an
immigration habeas case, a federal district court in the District of Kansas
noted in a footnote that it read Pugh as precluding the application of the
EAJA to immigration habeas.246 And, in 2019, we come back to the case
with which this Article began: Obando-Segura, where a federal district court
in the District of Maryland agreed with ICE’s interpretation of O’Brien and
held that fees under the EAJA were not available in immigration habeas.
When it comes to the question of whether the EAJA reaches immigration
habeas, ICE is a classic repeat player, “which has had and anticipates
repeated litigation, which has low stakes in the outcome of any one case, and
which has the resources to pursue its long-run interests.”247 And, just as
predicted by Professor Marc Galanter’s theory, as a repeat player, ICE can
strategically play for the rules of litigation itself—i.e., the judicial
interpretation holding that the EAJA’s use of the term “civil action” does not
include immigration habeas proceedings—rather than just the outcome in a
specific case—i.e., the payment of fees in a given case.248
The history of the case law shows that ICE can consider when and where
to advance arguments as part of a long-term campaign. More tactically, ICE
can selectively settle cases or accept a trial-level loss instead of appealing to
240. Vacchio v. Ashcroft, 404 F.3d 663, 672 (2d Cir. 2005).
241. Opposition to Petitioner’s EAJA Petition, Gorsira v. Loy, No. 03CV01184 (D. Conn.
Nov. 8, 2005), ECF No. 51.
242. Gorsira v. Chertoff, No. 03CV1184, 2006 WL 197343, at *1 (D. Conn. Jan. 25, 2006).
243. Government’s Response to Petitioner’s Request for Costs and Fees at 7–11,
Kholyavskiy v. Schlecht, No. 05-cv-00671 (E.D. Wis. May 17, 2006), ECF No. 34.
244. Kholyavskiy v. Schlecht, 479 F. Supp. 2d 897, 901 (E.D. Wis. 2007) (quoting
Vacchio, 404 F.3d at 672).
245. Al-Shewailey v. Mukasey, No. CIV-07-1392, 2008 WL 542956, at *2 (W.D. Okla.
Feb. 25, 2008).
246. Abuya v. Sessions, No. 17-2293, at *1 n.1 (D. Kan. Aug. 17, 2017) (relying on Sloan
in a footnote to deny attorneys’ fees in an immigration habeas case). Unfortunately, as
discussed below, the briefing was not available via PACER.
247. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 98 (1974).
248. See id. at 100–01.

2022]

FEE RETRENCHMENT

1517

avoid creating negative precedent within circuits it perceives as hostile to its
position. In some habeas proceedings, ICE stipulates to attorneys’ fees under
the EAJA as part of a settlement agreement.249 ICE also affirmatively
conceded the issue before a district court within the Second Circuit following
Vacchio.250 On some occasions, ICE is silent about the issue, and ICE wins
or loses on other grounds.251 When the issue is contested at the trial-court
level, ICE can choose to appeal or defend a decision, as seen in Vacchio and
Obando-Segura, or to take the loss, as in Kholyavskiy v. Schlecht252 or
Ortega v. Hodgson,253 a 2012 case from the District of Massachusetts.254
ICE can also be strategic about how it tries to go about getting courts to
adopt its interpretation of the law. Most directly, it can raise new or renewed
arguments multiple times because the costs—both in terms of resources and
precedential case law—are likely modest.
Exemplifying the cost
efficiencies, before the district court in Obando-Segura, ICE devoted only
one double-spaced page to its argument that the EAJA did not reach habeas
proceedings. In the trial-level proceedings in O’Brien, the government did
not even advance that argument until after it lost on its other arguments
against the award of fees. The appellate briefs in Obando-Segura and
O’Brien engaged much more robustly with the issue. But even there, the
government’s costs are likely modest because agencies may rely on their
institutional expertise—the DOJ even maintains “brief banks” on recurring
issues.255 The similarity of the arguments advanced in Kholyavskiy, Vacchio,
and Obando-Segura certainly suggest that ICE is taking advantage of
knowledge-sharing within the agency. As to the precedential impacts, no
district court opinion has any formal precedential force beyond the particular
249. See, e.g., Bourguignon v. MacDonald, No. 09-cv-30068 (D. Mass. Apr. 29, 2010)
(stipulating to EAJA fee shifting in immigration habeas proceeding).
250. D’Alessandro v. Mukasey, No. 08-CV-914, 2010 WL 1404909, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Mar.
31, 2010) (“Respondents conceded that the present action is a ‘civil action.’”), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 08-CV-914, 2010 WL 2710623 (W.D.N.Y. July 6, 2010).
251. See, e.g., Dvorkin v. Gonzales, 173 F. App’x 420, 423–24 (6th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)
(reversing the district court’s award of attorney’s fees because the government’s position was
substantially justified where ICE did not raise the issue as to whether the EAJA applies to an
immigration habeas petition); Sotelo-Aquije v. Slattery, 62 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1995)
(reversing denial of EAJA fees based on “substantial justification” prong); Cheng v. McCredit,
No. 94 C 7520, 1995 WL 430953, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 1995) (noting that the government
raised only a substantial justification argument). Of course, even when ICE is silent, courts
may note their position. See, e.g., Al-Shewailey v. Mukasey, No. CIV-07-1392, 2008 WL
542956, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 25, 2008) (denying attorneys’ fees to an immigration habeas
petitioner under the EAJA because of Pugh even though the issue was not in the briefing);
Yafaee v. Holder, No. 09 Civ. 7946, 2010 WL 451030, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2010) (noting
that the EAJA reaches immigration habeas but was unavailable in the instant case because
ICE mooted the case and the petitioner was pro se).
252. 479 F. Supp. 2d 897 (E.D. Wis. 2007).
253. No. 11-10358-MBB, 2012 WL 1658931 (D. Mass. May 10, 2012).
254. Id. at *3 n.2 (noting that the EAJA applies to immigration habeas and awarding fees).
255. See Amparo v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 12-cv-6403, 2014 WL 4678033, at *4
(D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2014) (describing the savings to private practitioners, government lawyers,
and courts that come from being able to reuse materials from similar cases); Shapiro v. U.S.
Dep’t of Just., 969 F. Supp. 2d 18, 24–25 (D.D.C. 2013) (describing DOJ’s “brief bank” for
use in repeated FOIA litigation).
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case, so it is not high cost if ICE loses in a particular case.256 And even
circuit court opinions will usually only bind the agency in a specific
geographic region.257
One caveat to this discussion of how ICE is well-situated to strategically
create favorable case law is that agencies presumably want to avoid
antagonizing courts and, thus, limit their nonacquiescence. And, in the
context of the EAJA, agency nonacquiescence within a jurisdiction has “led
invariably to a finding of no substantial justification,” removing a potential
fee defense.258 While nonacquiescence is unlikely to result in a contempt
finding,259 the District of Columbia Circuit sanctioned the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) for its policy of nonacquiescence where the NLRB
did not actively seek Supreme Court review of the contested issue and lacked
candor in its application.260 But ICE might very well be attempting to create
a circuit split with the Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit, hoping to put the
issue before a potentially friendly Supreme Court. As noted above, before
his elevation to the bench, Chief Justice Roberts had publicly written against
this sort of fee shifting.261 Justice Alito also recently signaled his approval
of O’Brien.262 Additionally, although it gives little airtime to Vacchio in its
briefs,263 ICE does not seem to be hiding its nonacquiescence. Instead, as is
common with agency nonacquiescence, ICE is simply interpreting the case
law aggressively in its favor.264
A second caveat to this discussion is that many of the briefs in the cases
cited above are unavailable on PACER. Many of the cases took place before
widespread electronic filing began in 2002.265 Additionally, the cases after
256. Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011); BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE LAW
255 (2016).
257. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 217, at 679, 699–702; Linda R. Cohen &
Matthew L. Spitzer, The Government Litigant Advantage: Implications for the Law, 28 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 391, 402–03 (2000).
258. Sisk, supra note 100, at 64 (citing Love v. Heckler, 588 F. Supp. 1346, 1348 (M.D.
Ala. 1984)).
259. See Nicholas R. Parrillo, The Endgame of Administrative Law: Governmental
Disobedience and the Judicial Contempt Power, 131 HARV. L. REV. 685, 691 n.15 (2018)
(distinguishing noncompliance and nonacquiescence).
260. Heartland Plymouth Ct. MI, LLC v. NLRB, 838 F.3d 16, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
261. Burbank & Farhang, supra note 133, at 41.
262. Banister v. Davis, 140 S. Ct. 1698, 1715 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing O’Brien
with approval).
263. Respondent-Appellee’s Brief, Obando-Segura v. Garland, 999 F.3d 190 (4th Cir.
2021) (No. 19-7736); Respondent’s Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for Award of
Attorney’s Fees, Obando-Segura v. Barr, No. 17-3190 (D. Md. Oct. 18, 2019), 2019 WL
12336432.
264. See Wendy Wagner, Revisiting the Impact of Judicial Review on Agency Rulemakings:
An Empirical Investigation, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1717, 1760–61 (2012) (describing
EPA’s creative attempts at interpretation when faced with unwelcome judicial precedent);
ROBERT J. HUME, HOW COURTS IMPACT FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 77–78 (2009)
(describing the same phenomena).
265. Peter W. Martin, Online Access to Court Records—From Documents to Data,
Particulars to Patterns, 53 VILL. L. REV. 855, 862 (2008) (discussing the E-Government Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.)).
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2009 are subject to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2, which limits
electronic access to immigration dockets.266 It also would not be surprising
to learn that many more cases are effectively invisible because they do not
have published orders.267
ICE’s nonacquiescence also foists costs on noncitizen detainees and the
courts themselves. To the former, the agency can make all noncitizen
detainees bring their own challenges to ICE’s interpretation of the EAJA,
even though the circuit courts have spoken in a single voice.268 To the latter,
circuit courts appear to be sensitive to the number of appeals that stem from
an agency’s policy of nonacquiescence, responding with greater deference to
the agency decisions.269 This, however, is probably less of a concern given
the number of noncitizen petitioners that proceed pro se and their low win
rates.270
In addition to the costs that ICE’s nonacquiescence might place on
noncitizen detainees and courts, the lower-court precedent matters, too. As
discussed above, the Supreme Court might not for a long time decide whether
the EAJA covers immigration habeas. In the meantime, the lower courts will
follow each other—particularly in the circuits without directly controlling
precedent.271 Illustrating how quickly and broadly this can happen, two
earlier unreported district court decisions in Obando-Segura have already
been cited by six other courts.272 And, even if the Fourth Circuit reverses the
266. FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2; see also Nancy Morawetz, A Better Balance for Federal Rules
Governing Public Access to Appeal Records in Immigration Cases, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1271
passim (2018) (discussing history and issues).
267. Michael Kagan et al., Invisible Adjudication in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 106 GEO.
L.J. 683, 698–99 (2018) (showing that many unpublished merits decisions in immigration
appeals are not available on Westlaw); see also Merritt E. McAlister, “Downright
Indifference”: Examining Unpublished Decisions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 118
MICH. L. REV. 533, 548 (2020) (noting that some circuit courts have specific procedures for
dealing with immigration appeals).
268. Woolman, supra note 212, at 133.
269. See Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1123–24 (2011)
(describing increased deference by the Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit when faced with a
surge of immigration appeals); Diller & Reinert, supra note 219, at 103–04 (describing the
impacts of Social Security Administration’s flooding the courts with appeals due to policy of
nonacquiescence).
270. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. Immigr. Laws. Ass’n in Support of Appellant and
Reversal, Maldonado-Velasquez v. Moniz, No. 17-1918 (1st Cir. Nov. 28, 2017) (stating that
76 percent of immigration habeas petitions filed in Massachusetts were pro se); Kevin R.
Johnson, Los Olvidados: Images of the Immigrant, Political Power of Noncitizens, and
Immigration Law and Enforcement, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1139, 1209 n.280 (stating that the
United States “prevailed in over 91% of habeas corpus proceedings challenging exclusion
orders and over 64% of appeals of deportation orders in 1990”).
271. See Seth Katsuya Endo, Contracting for Confidential Discovery, 53 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1249, 1254 (2020) (describing how district courts treat each other’s orders as persuasive
informal authority in the discovery context); Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Horizontal Procedure
29–38 (2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (describing general phenomena).
See generally Maggie Gardner, Dangerous Citations, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1619 (2020); Brian
Soucek & Remington B. Lamons, Heightened Pleading Standards for Defendants: A Case
Study of Court-Counting Precedent, 70 ALA. L. REV. 875 (2019).
272. See Duncan v. Kavanagh, 439 F. Supp. 3d 576, 588 (D. Md. 2020); Abshir H.A. v.
Barr, No. 19-cv-1033, 2019 WL 3719467, at *9 (D. Minn. June 28, 2019), report and
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Obando-Segura decision in this particular instance, it provides ICE and other
recalcitrant district courts with a blueprint that might lead to a split further
down the line.273
Another concern with using agency nonacquiescence in this sort of
retrenchment effort is that, if habeas proceedings involving a detained
noncitizen facing removal for an underlying criminal conviction are not
considered “civil actions” for the purposes of the EAJA, the interpretation
likely will creep into other contexts.274 In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court
rejected the catalyst theory, holding that the term “prevailing party,” as used
in the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988275 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990,276 only applied when a litigant achieved some
court-ordered relief.277 The lower courts quickly applied this same definition
to a plethora of other federal fee-shifting statutes, including the Social
Security Act,278 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,279 and the
EAJA.280 Even more directly on point, the holding in Ardestani quickly
migrated from just removal proceedings to other types of administrative

recommendation adopted, No. 19-1033, 2019 WL 3719414 (D. Minn. Aug. 7, 2019);
Campbell v. Barr, 387 F. Supp. 3d 286, 296 (W.D.N.Y. 2019); Mohamed A. v. Neilsen,
No. 19-cv-49, 2019 WL 2396761, at *4 (D. Minn. May 16, 2019), report and recommendation
rejected sub nom. Mohamed A. v. McAleenan, No. 19-cv-0049, 2019 WL 2395408 (D. Minn.
June 6, 2019); Omar M. v. Barr, No. 18-cv-2646, 2019 WL 3570790, at *5 (D. Minn. May 6,
2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 18-cv-2646, 2019 WL 2755937 (D. Minn.
July 2, 2019), appeal dismissed sub nom. Mohamed v. Barr, No. 19-2881, 2019 WL 8112881
(8th Cir. Oct. 17, 2019); Misquitta v. Warden Pine Prairie ICE Processing Ctr., 353 F. Supp.
3d 518, 525 (W.D. La. 2018).
273. While this concern might seem overblown, recall that the controlling argument in
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), was first raised in a 1960s student note
that began by citing a contest-winning essay published in a National Rifle Association
periodical. See Stuart R. Hays, Note, The Right to Bear Arms, A Study in Judicial
Misinterpretation, 2 WM. & MARY L. REV. 381, 381 (1960). And, given the appearance of
agency nonacquiescence, it is hard to imagine that ICE is going to abandon this argument after
finally achieving some traction with it.
274. See generally Tal Kastner & Ethan J. Leib, Contract Creep, 107 GEO. L.J. 1277, 1279–
80 (2019) (describing how contract doctrines migrate from one context to another); Mark A.
Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687,
1697–98 (1999) (identifying “doctrinal creep” in trademark law).
275. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
and 42 U.S.C.).
276. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
and 47 U.S.C.).
277. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 532
U.S. 598, 609 (2001).
278. Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
279. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scatter sections of 42
U.S.C.).
280. See Kyle A. Loring, Note, The Catalyst Theory Meets the Supreme Court—Common
Sense Takes a Vacation, 43 B.C. L. REV. 973, 993 n.198 (2002) (collecting cases, including
Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 277 (4th Cir. 2002) (Social Security Act); J.C. v. Reg’l Sch.
Dist. 10, 278 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2002) (Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act);
Johnson v. ITT Aerospace/Commc’ns Div. of ITT Indus., Inc., 272 F.3d 498, 500 (7th Cir.
2001) (all fee-shifting provisions, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)).

2022]

FEE RETRENCHMENT

1521

hearings.281 Were ICE’s interpretation of the EAJA’s use of “civil action”
to take root and spread, it would weaken the ability of private citizens to
enforce their civil rights in a variety of contexts.
III. APPLYING A PROCEDURAL JUSTICE LENS
Once the reading out of habeas from the EAJA’s use of the term “civil
action” is understood as an example of rights retrenchment,
procedure-focused frameworks naturally lend themselves and add to a richer
understanding of the normative implications of the issue. Chief among these
procedure-focused frameworks is the three-factor balancing framework from
Mathews v. Eldridge.282
As Justice David Souter explained,
“[t]he Mathews analysis has thus been used as a general approach for
determining the procedures required by due process whenever erroneous
governmental action would infringe an individual’s protected interest.”283
The Mathews factors shed light on the normative question of whether
immigration habeas proceedings should be covered by the term “civil
action.” The normative inquiry is especially important because the practical
effects of fee shifting are difficult to empirically prove as one sees in the
conflicting judicial positions about the benefits of the EAJA. Faced with this
sort of uncertainty, any legal decision implicitly takes a stance on who will
bear the burden of a possible mistake.284 The Mathews factors demonstrate
that the award of attorneys’ fees in immigration removal proceedings is most
consistent with a view of procedural justice that values accuracy, efficiency,
and participation.285

281. See Dart v. United States, 961 F.2d 284, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (applying the prohibition
on attorneys’ fees awards under the EAJA to the Export Administration Act); Johnson, supra
note 112, at 480 n.329 (citing Friends of the Earth v. Reilly, 966 F.2d 690, 692 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (applying the prohibition on attorneys’ fees awards under the EAJA to the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act)).
282. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
283. Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 148 (1991) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also
Garrett, supra note 24, at 75 (noting that the use of the Mathews framework for assessing
procedural issues broadly is “not an outlier approach”).
284. See Allison Orr Larsen, Judging “Under Fire” and the Retreat to Facts, 61 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1083, 1090 (2020) (discussing judges’ use of facts to defend politically fraught
decisions).
285. Many readers will recognize these factors as coming from Lawrence B. Solum’s
Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 237, 244–60 (2004) (explaining the goal of
incorporating the accuracy, balancing, and participation models of procedural justice “into a
unified theory of procedural justice”). These factors and their link to the Mathews framework
are explained further in the main text of this part.
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A. The Mathews Framework
1. Understanding the Framework
It is a foundational command that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”286 These constitutional
prohibitions act, primarily, as bulwarks against executive or judicial
misconduct by ensuring that any deprivation is authorized by law.287 The
Due Process Clauses further constrain legislatures from authorizing
executive or judicial deprivations that do not provide processes that are fair
to the parties given the specific circumstances.288 But neither the Fifth nor
Fourteenth Amendments detail exactly what process is due.
In Mathews, the Supreme Court set forth a general framework for
evaluating due process challenges to state procedures.289 The approach
requires courts to weigh (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the
official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that
the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”290
The Mathews Court specifically addressed the constitutionality of
administrative fact-finding procedures used in social security disability
benefits determinations.291 But the three-factor framework has been widely
adopted by courts and applied to challenges to procedures for state
determinations ranging from involuntarily committing a minor to retrieving
an impounded automobile.292 And commentators have observed that courts
frequently use a similar weighing even with subconstitutional questions that
have arisen in the contexts of pleading, notice, and discovery.293 More
286. U.S. CONST. amend. V (applying to the federal government); U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1 (applying to the states).
287. See Gary Lawson et al., “Oh Lord, Please Don’t Let Me Be Misunderstood!”:
Rediscovering the Mathews v. Eldridge and Penn Central Frameworks, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1, 7–8 (2005) (explaining how this check “befit[s] their origins in Article 39 of the Magna
Carta”).
288. See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,
276 (1856); see also Lawson et al., supra note 287, at 7–15 (describing the history of
procedural due process from the adoption of the Constitution through Mathews).
289. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion)
(explaining that the Mathews framework is “[t]he ordinary mechanism that we use . . . for
determining the procedures that are necessary to ensure that a citizen is not ‘deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law’”); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599 (1979)
(“[O]ur prior holdings have set out a general approach for testing challenged state procedures
under a due process claim.”).
290. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
291. Id. at 339–40.
292. City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 717–19 (2003); Parham, 442 U.S. at
599–600.
293. See, e.g., Andrew Blair-Stanek, Twombly Is the Logical Extension of the Mathews v.
Eldridge Test to Discovery, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2010) (arguing that Twombly “is merely an
extension of the familiar and often-used Mathews v. Eldridge three-factor balancing test
applied to property and liberty deprivations imposed by discovery, which commences after an
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directly, the Mathews framework has been used in both immigration cases294
and right-to-counsel cases.295 A plethora of scholars have used this
framework in the immigration context, too.296
The ubiquity of the Mathews framework alone might not be sufficient to
justify its use in evaluating whether the EAJA encompasses immigration
habeas where the practical legal question is primarily one of statutory
interpretation, not procedural due process.297 But these divisions are
permeable. In Landon v. Plasencia,298 the Supreme Court reexamined its
removal precedent and noted that, in an earlier immigration case, “[a]lthough
the holding was one of regulatory interpretation, the rationale was one of
constitutional law.”299
Additionally, the Mathews framework also provides a structure for
considering the normative question: which interpretation is more consistent
with the notions of reasonableness and fairness that comprise a vision of
procedural justice? Professor Lawrence Solum’s article, Procedural Justice,
recognizes participation, accuracy, and efficiency (described as “balancing”)

unsuccessful motion to dismiss”); Seth Katsuya Endo, Technological Opacity & Procedural
Injustice, 59 B.C. L. REV. 821, 832 (2018) (identifying the implicit use of factors in discovery
disputes); Jason Parkin, Dialogic Due Process, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1115, 1127 (2019)
(“Despite their differences, the Court has clarified that the Mathews and Mullane tests are to
be applied in a similar fashion, with courts weighing the individual’s interests against the
interests of the government.”).
294. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34–35 (1982) (discussing the Mathews
factors in a challenge to INS procedures); Cancino Castellar v. McAleenan, 388 F. Supp. 3d
1218, 1238–44 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (applying Mathews to assess whether procedural due process
requires a prompt postarrest hearing before an immigration judge for noncitizens detained by
ICE); Hernandez v. Lynch, No. EDCV 16-00620, 2016 WL 7116611, at *25 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
10, 2016), aff’d sub nom. Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2017) (evaluating
whether immigration officials setting a bond amount under § 1226(a) must look to detainees’
financial situation and alternatives to detention to satisfy the Due Process Clause).
295. See, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 444–45 (2011) (determining whether due
process required counsel when an individual faces imprisonment for civil contempt); Lassiter
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (considering whether
a failure to appoint counsel for indigent parents in proceeding for termination of parental status
was constitutional).
296. See, e.g., Johan Fatemi, A Constitutional Case for Appointed Counsel in Immigration
Proceedings: Revisiting Franco-Gonzalez, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 915, 953–63 (2016)
(applying the framework to the women and children detained as part of the 2014–2015 “border
surge”); Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent Residents, 122
YALE L.J. 2394, 2404–14 (2013) (applying the framework to immigration proceedings for
lawful permanent residents); Cindy S. Woods, Barriers to Due Process for Indigent Asylum
Seekers in Immigration Detention, 45 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 319, 333 (2019) (applying
the framework for asylum seekers); Ramanujan Nadadur, Note, Beyond “Crimigration” and
the Civil-Criminal Dichotomy—Applying Mathews v. Eldridge in the Immigration Context, 16
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 141, 161–67 (2013) (applying framework in “crimigration”
context). Jennifer Lee Koh has explained that the “lion’s share of reform proposals have
focused on improving the law, policies, and resources associated with the immigration courts”
because of the inadequate existing procedures. Koh, supra note 15, at 183.
297. See supra Part II.A.
298. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
299. Id. at 33.
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as the three norms that go into a robust notion of procedural justice.300 Each
of these three norms is accounted for in the Mathews framework.301
First, under Solum’s definition, the participation norm encompasses the
procedural advantages that do not go to either accuracy or cost, such as “the
right to observe, to make arguments, to present evidence, and to be informed
of the reasons for a decision.”302
The Mathews Court explicitly
acknowledged that the right to be heard is a cornerstone of due process.303
The Court also identified the various ways afforded recipients of disability
benefits to make their case, such as the submission of medical information,
access to the information relied upon by the state agency, a tentative
assessment with the rationale and summary of evidence supporting the
determination, and opportunities to add evidence or contest the agency’s
tentative conclusions.304
The accuracy norm seeks to ensure that legal decisions are substantively
correct—that is, the true facts have been uncovered and adduced along with
a proper application of the law.305 Similarly, the second Mathews factor is
the “fairness and reliability of the existing . . . procedures, and the probable
value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards.”306 In examining this
factor, the Court highlighted the “truth-finding” function of the processes.307
In assessing this factor, the Court identified the various procedures that
enabled a disability benefits recipient to submit information to the agency for
its consideration and to identify any errors made by the agency.308 The Court
determined that the existing procedures survived the procedural due process
challenge because the eligibility determinations generally turned on written
submissions and records submitted by medical professionals—evidence that
was viewed as highly reliable.309
300. Solum, supra note 285, at 244–60.
301. See Seth Katsuya Endo, Discovery Hydraulics, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1317, 1323–24
(2019) (identifying how the Mathews framework integrates these norms when the framework
is used to resolve discovery disputes). Additionally, in that habeas proceedings are
governed—at least, in part—by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it would also be
consistent to consider Rule 1, which commands courts to construe, administer, and employ
the rules “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.” FED. R. CIV. P. 1. See generally Civil Discovery in Habeas Corpus, 67 COLUM.
L. REV. 1296, 1299 (1967) (describing when several Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply
to habeas).
302. Solum, supra note 285, at 280.
303. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“The fundamental requirement of
due process is the opportunity to be heard . . . .”).
304. Id. at 345–46; see also Endo, supra note 293, at 833 (discussing the presence of the
participation norm in Mathews); Solum, supra note 285, at 309–10 (explaining how Mathews
is consistent with the participation principle).
305. Solum, supra note 285, at 211.
306. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343; see also Jay Tidmarsh, Superiority as Unity, 107 NW. U.
L. REV. 565, 582 (2013) (explaining that the Mathews approach “balances the costs of
additional process against the gains in accuracy that the additional process is expected to
generate”).
307. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344.
308. See id. at 343–47.
309. See id. at 343–44.
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In a world of limited resources, the efficiency norm seeks to strike a
balance between the costs of process and its benefits.310 At its core, the
Mathews approach engages in a similar exercise—weighing the accuracy and
participation benefits against the cost.311 To this, the Mathews decision
explicitly noted the financial costs and administrative burdens of additional
procedure as comprising parts of the government’s interest.312
The power of the Mathews framework derives from its flexibility, which
leaves much to its implementation in particular cases.313 And courts have
identified values like dignity as part of the private interest or government
interest factors.314 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that one of the
“central concerns of procedural due process” is “the promotion of
participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the decisionmaking
process.”315 Even the Mathews Court cautioned that the financial costs were
not a dispositive factor, which implicitly acknowledges that the balance to be
undertaken is not just a sparse pecuniary accounting.316 And so, the Mathews
framework accommodates important values, even where the original opinion
did not explicitly acknowledge them.317
The migration of Mathews has had positive effects, particularly in the
immigration context. Classically, noncitizens did not have true due process
rights in immigration proceedings—the plenary power doctrine tended to
resolve most issues.318 But just six years after Mathews, the Supreme Court
applied its balancing framework in an immigration removal case, Landon v.
Plasencia.319 This new approach led to more flexible, individual
examination of cases, which let courts address underlying constitutional

310. Solum, supra note 285, at 308.
311. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (“[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands.” (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
481 (1972))).
312. Id. at 347 (“This includes the administrative burden and other societal costs that would
be associated with requiring, as a matter of constitutional right, an evidentiary hearing upon
demand in all cases prior to the termination of disability benefits.”).
313. See Adam N. Steinman, The End of an Era?: Federal Civil Procedure After the 2015
Amendments, 66 EMORY L.J. 1, 53 (2016) (explaining that, following the 2015 amendments
to the discovery rules, “the key battleground will be the federal courts themselves, as judges
are called upon to interpret and apply the rules in particular cases”).
314. See, e.g., Conti v. Dyer, 593 F. Supp. 696, 703 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (“California, through
its courts, has stated that its governmental interests include freeing the individual from
‘arbitrary adjudicative procedures’ and ‘recognizing the dignity and worth of the individual
by treating him as an equal, fully participating and responsible member of society.’”).
315. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
316. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348 (“Financial cost alone is not a controlling weight in
determining whether due process requires a particular procedural safeguard prior to some
administrative decision.”).
317. See Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1353
(2011) (“[I]n the context of deportation, maybe the problem is not the civil approach but rather
that the courts have just done a bad job applying the Mathews test in deportation cases.”).
318. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950); see also
Joseph Landau, Due Process and the Non-Citizen: A Revolution Reconsidered, 47 CONN. L.
REV. 879, 890–94 (2015) (describing the history of due process rights held by noncitizens).
319. 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982); see also Motomura, supra note 52, at 1656.
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values and prevent overreach by the political branches.320 Courts now
routinely treat the Mathews framework as the standard in immigration
removal cases.321
2. Applying the Framework
The following analysis applies the Mathews framework to whether the
term “civil action,” as used in the EAJA, should include habeas immigration
proceedings. This is a normative inquiry, not a proposed application for an
outcome-determinative legal test.322 Although the Mathews framework
lends itself to straightforward constitutional argument in favor of the
availability of attorneys’ fees—or even counsel—in habeas proceedings
challenging the conditions of detention or removal, there are several reasons
why that is not the focus of this Article. First, as a practical matter, courts
frequently employ the constitutional avoidance canon when addressing
immigration statutes. So, as a practical matter, courts do not reach the
constitutional issue presented in a case but do consider the constitutional
implications when interpreting the presented statutory issue.323 As Professor
Alina Das has observed, in the immigration context, the canon of
constitutional avoidance may even trump Chevron deference principles.324
Second, these arguments have already been made in other removal-related or
general civil Gideon articles.325

320. See Motomura, supra note 52, at 1656; Matthew J. Lindsay, Disaggregating
“Immigration Law,” 68 FLA. L. REV. 179, 243 (2016); Landau, supra note 318, at 894 (noting
that the expansion of the Mathews framework to immigration can help limit political branch
overreach).
321. See Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration “Disaggregation” and the Mainstreaming of
Immigration Law, 68 FLA. L. REV. F. 38, 43 (2016) (“Generally applicable procedural due
process doctrine has become the accepted norm in immigration removal cases.”).
322. Accordingly, the exact parameters of immigrant detainees’ cognizable Due Process
Clause rights fall outside of this Article’s purview. With that said, the Plasencia decision
noted that “once an alien gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go
with permanent residence, his constitutional status changes accordingly.” Landon v. Plasencia,
459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982). Other commentators have more fully addressed this issue, as well as
the relationship between procedural due process and habeas. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 52, at
1014–15; Anthony R. Enriquez, Structural Due Process in Immigration Detention, 21 CUNY
L. REV. 35, 56 (2017); Garrett, supra note 24, at 97-100.
323. See, e.g., King & Hall, supra note 68, at 21–22 (discussing the application of the
constitutional avoidance doctrine in Zadvydas and Jennings). Additionally, even the
immigration agencies make policy choices that are shaped by procedural due process norms.
See Alina Das, Administrative Constitutionalism in Immigration Law, 98 B.U. L. REV. 485,
518 (2018) (providing examples of BIA policies, such as one that excludes unlawfully
acquired evidence).
324. See Alina Das, Unshackling Habeas Review: Chevron Deference and Statutory
Interpretation in Immigration Detention Cases, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 143, 191–92 (2015).
325. See, e.g., Chacón, supra note 126, at 1629–30; Genieva A. Hylton, Justice for All:
The Right to Counsel for Unaccompanied Alien Children, 31 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 157, 169
(2016); King & Hall, supra note 68, at 62.
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a. Private Interest of Detainees Pending Removal
The Mathews framework starts with “the private interest that will be
affected by the official action.”326 A narrow construction of the private
interest at stake with whether the EAJA includes immigration habeas might
be understood as simply the availability of compensated counsel. And it is
beyond peradventure that individuals whose rights are adjudicated through
judicial processes must be given a chance to be heard.327 The value of this
right is further addressed below as part of the second Mathews factor. As to
the first Mathews factor, as applied in these sorts of immigration removal
cases, the availability of counsel is really meant to effectuate two underlying
categories of private interests.328
First, as illustrated by Mr.
Obando-Segura’s story in the introduction, individuals subject to removal are
frequently detained pending their removal. Second, the removal itself
presents a set of significant private interests.
Most directly, an individual’s detention necessarily implicates the liberty
interest. In other applications of the Mathews framework, the Supreme Court
has identified being free from physical detention as the “most elemental of
liberty interests.”329 The concern about freedom from confinement is echoed
in numerous other cases.330 Although the Supreme Court has not uniformly
held that there is a right to legal assistance when an individual faces civil
detention, the centrality of physical liberty has never been questioned.331
The private interest in liberty is particularly pressing in the immigration
removal context because the duration can be long and uncertain.332 About a
decade ago, one researcher found that the average immigration case had been
pending for about a year and a half.333 Given ICE’s increased enforcement,
the court backlogs have likely grown.334
326. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
327. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971) (“[A]bsent a countervailing state
interest of overriding significance, persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty
through the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.”); see also
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–45 (1963) (finding a right to counsel in criminal
trials).
328. See generally Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 445 (2011).
329. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004).
330. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (“Freedom from bodily restraint
has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary
governmental action.”); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979).
331. See, e.g., Turner, 564 U.S. at 445.
332. See Jenna Neumann, Note, Proposing a One-Year Time Bar for 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c),
115 MICH. L. REV. 707, 727 (2017); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 691–92 (2001)
(discussing the problem of indefinite detention).
333. See Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed
Counsel for Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 63, 80–81 (2012). To prevent any confusion, please note that this figure includes
those who are facing removal but are not being physically detained for the full time.
334. See id.; see also Enriquez, supra note 322, at 53 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae Ams.
for Immigrant Just., et al. in Support of Respondents at 31, Jennings v. Rodriguez (No.
15-1204) (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2017), 2017 WL 564164) (“Depending on the circuit, review of
an immigration detention habeas petition takes, on average, from five-and-a-half to nineteen
months.”).
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In addition to the intrinsic loss of liberty, imprisoned noncitizens awaiting
removal may encounter conditions that resemble penal confinement. As one
former detainee explained, “[t]hey call immigration detention civil
confinement, but prison is prison no matter what label you use, and prison
breaks people’s souls, hearts, and even minds.”335 In some facilities,
detainees are confined to their unit for as much as twenty-three hours per day
with limited visitation from friends and family.336 Additionally, the facilities
may not provide adequate health care or other services.337 A recent report
from the Office of the Inspector General detailed abuses that have occurred
at detention facilities, including sexual assault and the use of tear gas.338 And
the COVID-19 pandemic brought light to the unsafe detention conditions
endured by noncitizens awaiting removal.339
Another distinct aspect of immigration detention is that the removal
proceedings may be held in any immigration court and detained noncitizens
may be transferred to geographically isolated facilities.340 Geography
exacerbates the difficulties that detainees already face in finding counsel.341
Detention centers often are not close to cities where immigration lawyers are
typically found.342 And, when detained in geographically isolated locations,
detainees’ important social bonds with family and friends are disrupted.343
Detainees may also lose their employment,344 and their families may suffer,
too.345 Facing these various pressures, some noncitizens simply give up their
cases, regardless of the merits or the consequences.346
335. See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61
UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1387 (2014).
336. See id. at 1384.
337. See, e.g., OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., ICE DOES NOT FULLY USE CONTRACTING
TOOLS TO HOLD DETENTION FACILITY CONTRACTORS ACCOUNTABLE FOR FAILING TO MEET
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS (2019), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/201902/OIG-19-18-Jan19.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Z4L-NN4Z].
338. See Lane, supra note 126; Maria Sacchetti, DHS Inspector General Calls on ICE to
Better Oversee Jails, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2019, at A3.
339. See, e.g., supra note 63 (discussing Valenzuela Arias and other cases); Ryo, supra
note 128, at 751.
340. See Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation for Detained Immigrants Facing
Deportation: Varick Street Detention Facility, a Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 541, 556–
57 (2009).
341. See id. at 556–67.
342. See Fatma E. Marouf, Alternatives to Immigration Detention, 38 CARDOZO L. REV.
2141, 2150 (2017). The data makes clear how significant these factors, working in tandem,
can be. The Eagly-Shafer study found that “almost 90% of nondetained immigrants in New
York City secured counsel, compared to only .002% of detained respondents in Tucson,
Arizona.” Eagly & Shafer, supra note 130, at 8.
343. Jayashri Srikantiah, Reconsidering Money Bail in Immigration Detention, 52 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 521, 538 (2018).
344. See Andrés Dae Keun Kwon, Defending Criminal(ized) “Aliens” After Padilla:
Toward a More Holistic Public Immigration Defense in the Era of Crimmigration, 63 UCLA
L. REV. 1034, 1039 (2016).
345. See, e.g., Mirian G. Martinez-Aranda, Collective Liminality: The Spillover Effects of
Indeterminate Detention on Immigrant Families, 54 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 755, 755 (2020)
(describing the “shared condition of heightened threat and uncertainty experienced by
immigrant detainees and their families” while one is detained while awaiting removal).
346. See Noferi, supra note 333, at 80; see also Srikantiah, supra note 343, at 538.

2022]

FEE RETRENCHMENT

1529

The Supreme Court has recognized that removal is itself a “weighty”
private interest.347 An immigrant facing removal may lose the right to stay,
live, and work in the United States.348 And removal might entail permanent
separation from family members.349
The Supreme Court further
acknowledged that removal may “result also in loss of both property and life;
or of all that makes life worth living.”350 In sum, given the importance of
counsel and the significance of removal proceedings, the private interest at
stake is extremely high.
b. Value of Process
The second Mathews factor is “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards.”351 In the context of assessing
the availability of attorneys’ fees in immigration habeas, this factor requires
an examination of the benefits of providing attorneys’ fees to prevailing
parties in immigration habeas proceedings in light of the understanding that
fee shifting encourages greater representation, particularly for communities
that lack financial resources.352
As a group, detained immigrants facing removal are in dire need of
additional legal assistance. A 2015 study conducted by Professor Ingrid
Eagly and Steven Shafer examined removal proceedings, which make up 97
percent of immigration court proceedings.353 The Eagly-Shafer study found
that only 37 percent of immigrants secured representation in 1.2 million
deportation cases between 2007 and 2012.354
Conversely, “[i]t is axiomatic that the government is represented by
counsel at all times in the removal hearings.”355 As of 2014, nearly one
thousand attorneys within ICE represented the government in immigration
proceedings—a sharp increase from the amount employed in 2004.356

347. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982).
348. Id. (citing Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945)); see also Aris v. Mukasey,
517 F.3d 595, 600 (2d Cir. 2008).
349. Landon, 459 U.S. at 34.
350. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
351. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
352. Many of the statistics described below address the administrative proceedings. These
figures should still be reasonably probative because, as described in the Padilla litigation,
plaintiffs in immigration habeas proceedings “are frequently pro se.” See Padilla v. Immigr.
& Customs Enf’t, 953 F.3d 1134, 1146 (9th Cir. 2020). And recall that an amicus brief
suggested that 76 percent of immigration habeas petitions filed in Massachusetts were pro se.
Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 270. Moreover, the search issues that contribute to
underrepresentation in the administrative proceedings presumably remain present at the
habeas level.
353. Eagly & Shafer, supra note 130, at 12.
354. Id. at 7. Eagly and Shafer explain that this number is lower than the government
estimates, which look at the proportion of court proceedings with representation, not the
proportion of cases. Id.
355. Fatemi, supra note 296, at 932.
356. Id.
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Several of the Supreme Court’s decisions in right-to-counsel cases turned
on whether finding a right would either solve or create asymmetries between
the parties.357 These cases indicate that the presence of counsel on only one
side may distort the outcome of a proceeding.358 While immigration judges
may try to offset this dynamic by taking a more inquisitorial approach with
unrepresented litigants, the DOJ’s Executive Office for Immigration Review
recently reminded judges that “[t]he immigration court process is
adversarial.”359
A national study observed that immigration judges have incentives that
promote the completion of cases over providing due process, which raises
the risk of error.360 And judicial review of immigration decisions is
limited.361 Furthermore, immigration cases have more limited remote access
to the dockets than other cases, which might add to the necessity of having a
lawyer well versed in the area.362
An important factor affecting the right to the appointment of counsel is
“whether the probationer appears to be capable of speaking effectively for
himself.”363 The assistance of legal counsel is especially necessary when an
area of law is highly technical and complex or where a party faces other
barriers that prevent meaningful participation in the process.364 Both of these
conditions are often present in removal proceedings.

357. Compare Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973) (“The introduction of counsel
into a revocation proceeding will alter significantly the nature of the proceeding. If counsel
is provided for the probationer or parolee, the State in turn will normally provide its own
counsel . . . .”), with Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 446–47 (2011) (“[S]ometimes, as here,
the person opposing the defendant at the hearing is not the government represented by counsel
but the custodial parent unrepresented by counsel. A requirement that the State provide
counsel to the noncustodial parent in these cases could create an asymmetry of
representation . . . .”); see also Fatemi, supra note 296, at 932.
358. Corin James, Fairness and Efficiency in Removal Proceedings: The Hidden Costs of
Not Appointing Counsel to Noncitizens, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 391, 404–05 (2019).
359. Jain, supra note 17, at 317–18.
360. See Jacqueline Stevens et al., The Case Against Absolute Judicial Immunity for
Immigration Judges, 37 LAW & INEQ. 309, 381–83 (2019) (describing the limits of data
available on misconduct by immigration judges and how structural incentives promote case
completion at the risk of procedural regularity); see also Caroline Holliday, U.S. Citizens
Detained and Deported?: A Test of the Great Writ’s Reach in Protecting Due Process Rights
in Removal Proceedings, 60 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT II.-217, II.-218 (2019) (describing
the mistaken removal of foreign-born American citizens).
361. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010); see also Stephen H. Legomsky,
Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 TEX.
L. REV. 1615, 1616 (2000) (describing jurisdiction-stripping by Congress and doctrinal
limitations).
362. See generally Morawetz, supra note 266, at 1274 (noting that “Federal Rules
promulgated in 2009 provide for these cases to operate with an unusual veil of secrecy prior
to the publishing of court opinions”); see also Kagan et al., supra note 267.
363. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 791 (1973).
364. See Ardestani v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 502 U.S. 129, 138 (1991); see also
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 788; Jain, supra note 17, at 317 (“Adversarial legalism’s procedural
intricacy and contest-oriented nature make it a poor fit for immigration adjudication, in which
a noncitizen is likely to face a sharp power disparity due to harsh and confusing law, limited
access to counsel, and potential language barriers.”); James, supra note 358, at 401; Deborah
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Given the labyrinthine nature of immigrations laws, legal counsel is
especially important in removal proceedings.365 The difficulty of the area
may stem from highly technical, unique, and convoluted statutory provisions
that interlock in hard-to-follow ways.366 For example, with cancellation of
removal, several key terms are defined elsewhere in the governing statute.367
Additionally, in response to shifting political pressures, the legislative and
executive branches frequently change the substance and application of
immigration laws.368 Even the judiciary’s interpretation of statutes can be
difficult for experts to predict.369 And modern habeas practice is anything
but simple.370 Illustrating these dynamics, Professor Emily Ryo’s 2018 study
found that noncitizen detainees with counsel submitted documents and made
affirmative arguments at significantly higher rates than their unrepresented
counterparts in bond hearings.371
Noncitizens facing removal may also face communication barriers when
navigating the legal system without representation.372 The impossibility of
having a fair hearing when an individual is not fluent in English is well
established.373 Additionally, if detainees fear persecution if they are
deported, the fear itself can impede effective self-representation.374
Even more compellingly, several recent studies have established the
effectiveness of counsel in removal proceedings. While determining a
L. Rhode, Access to Justice: A Roadmap for Reform, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1227, 1238
(2014).
365. See Nehad v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 2008); Zhang v. United States,
506 F.3d 162, 169 (2d Cir. 2007) (describing immigration law as a “notoriously complex and
constantly shifting area of law”); Kevin R. Johnson, Ten Guiding Principles for Truly
Comprehensive Immigration Reform: A Blueprint, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1599, 1637 (2009).
366. See, e.g., Jill E. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence: Uncovering Contributors
to the Immigration Adjudication Crisis, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 541, 554 (2011) (describing
marijuana possession statutes that apply to noncitizens).
367. Id. at 557.
368. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-438, IMMIGRATION COURTS:
ACTIONS NEEDED TO REDUCE BACKLOG AND ADDRESS LONG-STANDING MANAGEMENT AND
OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES 27–28 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/685022.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R7XG-J7T6].
369. See Nancy Morawetz, Predicting the Meaning of INA § 242(b)(9), 14 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 453, 453 (2000) (discussing how “American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
(“AADC”) v. Reno serves as a recent reminder that talented lawyers and judges can fail to
anticipate an argument about a statute that the Court will ultimately adopt”).
370. See generally Michael Mello & Donna Duffy, Suspending Justice:
The
Unconstitutionality of the Proposed Six-Month Time Limit on the Filing of Habeas Corpus
Petitions by State Death Row Inmates, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 451, 489
(1990–91).
371. Emily Ryo, Representing Immigrants: The Role of Lawyers in Immigration Bond
Hearings, 52 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 503, 519 (2018).
372. See Jane Kaplan, Breaking Down the Barriers: Bringing Legal Technicians into
Immigration Law, 32 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 703, 704 (2019); see also Jennifer Lee Koh, The
Whole Better than the Sum: A Case for the Categorical Approach to Determining the
Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 296 (2012).
373. See, e.g., Orozco-Rangel v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 528 F.2d 224 (9th Cir.
1976) (per curiam) (noting the presence of an interpreter at a deportation hearing in holding
that the petitioners were accorded due process).
374. See Woods, supra note 296, at 333.
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baseline for the “right” outcome can be difficult, in an adversarial setting, a
reasonable estimate is the outcome reached when both sides are represented
by competent counsel.375 The Eagly-Shafer study observed that detained
immigrants with counsel received either a case termination or other relief in
over 20 percent of removal cases, while their unrepresented counterparts only
had a 2 percent success rate.376 The Eagly-Shafer findings are consistent
with a 2011 report initiated by Judge Robert Katzmann of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.377 The report found success rates dropped
from 18 percent to 3 percent in removal cases involving represented and
unrepresented parties, respectively.378 Other studies have likewise shown
that represented parties are more successful at every stage of immigration
proceedings than their unrepresented counterparts.379 A study of asylum
seekers from 2007 showed that “whether an asylum seeker is represented in
court is the single most important factor affecting the outcome of her
case.”380 And there is no reason to doubt that this holds true in other removal
cases.
The existing financial incentives already make it difficult for noncitizens
facing removal to find competent private attorneys. Removal cases are much
more “labor intensive, unpredictable, and time-consuming” than handling
transactional immigration matters like employment visas and naturalization
applications.381 Also, noncitizens facing removal tend to be less financially
secure than other immigrants who need counsel,382 which raises the risk that
they will default on their financial obligations and reduces their attractiveness
as a client base.383
In the face of the financial disincentives for private representation,
noncitizens facing removal have few other options.384 There is no
375. See D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in
Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121
YALE L.J. 2118, 2207 (2012).
376. Eagly & Shafer, supra note 130, at 50.
377. See Peter L. Markowitz et al., Accessing Justice: The Availability and Adequacy of
Counsel Removal Proceedings, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 357 (2011).
378. Id. at 364.
379. See, e.g., Asylum Representation Rates Have Fallen amid Rising Denial Rates, TRAC
IMMIGRATION (Nov. 28, 2017), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/491 [https://perma.cc/
J3NR-SQ3B] (finding that asylum seekers are five times more likely to gain asylum when
represented); CHARLES H. KUCK, LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED
REMOVAL: A SURVEY OF ALTERNATIVE PRACTICES 232, 239 (2004), https://www.uscirf.gov/
sites/default/files/resources/stories/pdf/asylum_seekers/legalAssist.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N73B-63S8]; DONALD KERWIN, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., REVISITING THE
NEED FOR APPOINTED COUNSEL 5–6 (2005), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/
files/publications/Insight_Kerwin.pdf [https://perma.cc/TZW3-2ZBY]; see also Russell
Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal About
When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 62–64 (2010) (collecting studies).
380. Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60
STAN. L. REV. 295, 340 (2007).
381. Markowitz, supra note 340, at 549.
382. Id. at 548.
383. Id. at 549.
384. Id. at 549–50.
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categorical constitutional right to appointed counsel under the Sixth
Amendment because, as the Supreme Court has held, “[a] deportation
proceeding is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this
country, not to punish an unlawful entry.”385 Still, the Criminal Justice
Act386 (CJA) has been used to fund public defenders’ work on immigration
issues that arise in connection with a criminal case or that arise when
detainees are held beyond a reasonable period, which has led to
groundbreaking case law like Zadvydas.387 But, despite its availability,
court-appointed counsel does not appear to be solving the system-level issue
of representation.388
This leaves only already overburdened and
underfunded pro bono counsel. Illustrating this predicament, the leading
nonprofit provider in New York can only serve less than 10 percent of the
at-need population.389 And other nonprofits generally cannot step in,
because any entity that receives funds from the Legal Services Corporation
is prohibited from engaging in various sorts of immigration representation.390
Ensuring that prevailing parties in removal proceedings remain entitled to
attorneys’ fees under the EAJA is not a panacea. As described above,
noncitizens facing removal already face a significant unmet need for
representation despite the incentives for attorneys to take these cases.391
Additionally, quite a few courts and researchers have questioned the overall
quality of lawyers who handle these cases. For example, a set of scholars
noted that “[l]ow-quality representation is too often the case at the
Immigration Court level” because the lawyers may lack the necessary
substantive expertise, have too many cases, simply not give sufficient
attention and care to each matter, or not even be actual lawyers.392 This
sentiment is widely echoed by courts across the nation.393 In an anonymous

385. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984); see
also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2015) (rejecting Kentucky’s argument that
deportation proceedings are categorically excluded from the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel).
386. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A.
387. Ingrid v. Eagly, Gideon’s Migration, 122 YALE L.J. 2282, 2298 (2013) (discussing
efforts under the CJA).
388. Rhode, supra note 364, at 1238 (“Although leading federal decisions authorize the
appointment of counsel to prevent erroneous judgments, surveys cannot find a single
immigration case in three decades where a noncitizen has been granted a lawyer.”).
389. Markowitz, supra note 340, at 549.
390. Id. at 550.
391. See Mortimer & Malmsheimer, supra note 131, at 357; see also Krent, supra note 97,
at 495.
392. Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Hamutal Bernstein, Improving Immigration Adjudications
Through Competent Counsel, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 58–59 (2008).
393. See, e.g., Aris v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 595, 596 (2d Cir. 2008) (“With disturbing
frequency, this Court encounters evidence of ineffective representation by attorneys retained
by immigrants seeking legal status in this country.”); Bouras v. Holder, 779 F.3d 665, 681
(7th Cir. 2015) (“There are some first-rate immigration lawyers, especially at law schools that
have clinical programs in immigration law, but on the whole the bar that defends immigrants
in deportation proceedings . . . is weak—inevitably, because most such immigrants are
impecunious and there is no government funding for their lawyers.”); Morales Apolinar v.
Mukasey, 514 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2008) (“All too often, vulnerable immigrants are preyed
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study of New York immigration judges, 37 percent of counsel in cases
involving criminal removal procedures were observed to be inadequate or
grossly inadequate.394 While by no means a given, in light of these findings,
it is possible that the availability of attorneys’ fees might most greatly
incentivize the types of lawyers with the lowest rates of success (i.e., solo
practitioners and lawyers practicing in small firms).395 On the other hand, it
might also ensure that nonprofits, which were one of the most successful
types of counsel, can continue to provide their excellent services and,
perhaps, even build capacity.396
c. The Government’s Interest
The third and final factor in the Mathews framework is “the Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.”397
In Mathews, the government’s interest included the tailoring of procedures
“to insure that [the individuals subject to the process] are given a meaningful
opportunity to present their case.”398 Here, the assistance of counsel is a
virtual necessity in the context of immigration habeas proceedings. The
public’s perception of the legal system as fair and legitimate follows this
opportunity to be heard.399
Additionally, the government has an interest in justice, which requires
procedures that ensure the reasonable accuracy of its judgments.400 Without
counsel, noncitizens facing removal are unlikely to effectively advance their
factual and legal arguments, undercutting the reliability of the
decision-making process.401 And the twin goals of the EAJA itself are
reducing the deterrent effect of seeking review of governmental action and
testing governmental regulations to “insure[] the legitimacy and fairness of
the law” by reducing the cost barrier and the potentially pernicious effects of
wealth imbalances between the parties.402 Financially incentivized counsel

upon by unlicensed notarios and unscrupulous appearance attorneys who extract heavy fees
in exchange for false promises and shoddy, ineffective representation.”).
394. See Markowitz et al., supra note 377, at 25.
395. Eagly & Shafer, supra note 130, at 52.
396. Id. at 53.
397. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
398. Id. at 349.
399. See Noferi, supra note 333, at 119.
400. See, e.g., Denko v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 351 F.3d 717, 731 n.10 (6th Cir.
2003) (“The INS has a strong interest in its procedures for accurate, efficient, and economical
adjudication of immigration matters.” (emphasis added)).
401. See William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1865, 1873–74 (2002).
402. See Comm’r, Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Jean, 496 U.S 154, 165 n.14 (1990);
see also Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 890 (1980). See generally Issachar Rosen-Zvi,
Just Fee Shifting, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 717, 719 (2010).
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might help noncitizens identify and combat discriminatory applications of
immigration laws.403
Furthermore, continuing to interpret noncriminal immigration habeas
proceedings as eligible for attorneys’ fees under the EAJA carries low
financial and administrative burdens. The statutory prerequisites that
attorneys’ fees only be awarded to prevailing parties in cases in which the
government’s position was not substantially justified should prevent
unprincipled lawyers from promoting meritless litigation.404 And the hourly
rate provided for by the EAJA is capped at a level that is frequently below
market.405 Although recent data is unavailable,406 the Department of
Homeland Security only spent $2.3 million on all EAJA payments in fiscal
year 2010.407 Moreover, a lack of financial resources should not be a barrier
to the courts.408
Promoting noncitizens’ access to counsel through the availability of
attorneys’ fees might actually save the federal government money.409 If the
availability of attorneys’ fees acts as a deterrent to wrongful detention and
helps courts more quickly determine the merits of cases, it would lead to a
relatively large net financial savings. For example, in 2016, the federal
government spent over $5 million per day to detain immigrants.410 This
figure does not include all of the secondary financial costs that accompany
the disruption to detainees’ communities.411 Even when legal representation
does not reduce the number of days a noncitizen is detained pending removal,
it can lead to cost savings by reducing the number of suits filed and other
streamlining of the process.412 The availability of an award of attorneys’ fees
403. See generally Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and
Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Doubling Down
on Racial Discrimination: The Racially Disparate Impacts of Crime-Based Removals, 66
CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 993, 1017–18 (2016).
404. See JOANNA R. LAMPE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11246, ATTORNEY’S FEES AND THE
EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT: LEGAL FRAMEWORK 1–2 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/IF11246.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8XK-4TYF].
405. Id. at 2.
406. The Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995 eliminated the reporting
requirements for EAJA awards. See Paul F. Figley, The Judgment Fund: America’s Deepest
Pocket & Its Susceptibility to Executive Branch Misuse, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 145, 178
(2015).
407. PAUL F. VERKUIL, REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN ON AGENCY AND COURT AWARDS IN FY
2010 UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT 8 (2013), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/FY%202010%20EAJA%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/HNF3-RRKM].
408. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380–81 (1971) (holding that due
process of law prohibits a state from denying indigent individuals the ability to seek judicial
dissolution of their marriages because of their inability to pay court fees and costs).
409. See Eagly & Shafer, supra note 130, at 59 (citing a NERA Economic Consulting
report, which found that “providing appointed counsel for immigrants in removal cases could
actually pay for itself”).
410. See Marouf, supra note 342, at 2149; see also Srikantiah, supra note 343, at 523.
411. See Edward R. Becker, Insuring Reliable Fact Finding in Guidelines Sentencing:
Must the Guarantees of the Confrontation and Due Process Clauses Be Applied?, 22 CAP. U.
L. REV. 1, 27–28 (1993).
412. See Eagly & Shafer, supra note 130, at 65 n.210 (citing studies from other areas of
law that show such improvements).
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might act as a general bulwark against the mandatory appointment of counsel
in all removal cases, which would come with a higher price tag.413
Removal also is unlikely to serve its stated policy goals of crime
prevention and national security. Removal does not stop any anti-American,
criminal activity; it merely moves the location.414 Its anti-crime goal is
likewise difficult to achieve given the lack of migrant criminality, the
overbroad reach of the policies, and lack of evidence of deterrence.415 The
history of racial animus driving crime-related deportation also cautions
against overly privileging these goals.416
The strongest government interest that favors the position that the EAJA
should not be read to include immigration habeas is the concern that the
immigration courts will be overwhelmed given their existing backlog of
cases.417 Even in 2011, the Third Circuit noted that that immigration judges
struggle with “an exponential growth in their caseloads” and that they often
are “overburdened and under-resourced.”418
In August 2019, one
immigration judge noted that there is a “backlog of more than 900,000
immigration cases nationwide.”419 But these capacity issues are not likely
turning on the availability of fees.420
In sum, the Mathews balance tips in favor making the award of attorneys’
fees available under the EAJA. The private interests at stake could hardly be
greater. Freedom from confinement “lies at the heart of the liberty that [the
Due Process] Clause protects.”421 And, in describing removal, the Supreme
413. See Nadadur, supra note 296, at 143 (noting that “providing counsel to indigent
noncitizens could be as much as $110 million per year”). While this $110 million figure is
quite high, notice it is still more than $50 million less than the cost of housing the detainees.
And the American Bar Association has called for government-provided counsel in removal
proceedings. See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 380, at 384.
414. Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control
and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1873–74 (2007).
415. Id. at 1879–85; see also Emily Ryo, Detention as Deterrence, 71 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 237, 237–38 (2019).
416. See Alina Das, Inclusive Immigrant Justice: Racial Animus and the Origins of
Crime-Based Deportation, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 171 passim (2018).
417. See Sara DeStefano, Note, Unshackling the Due Process Rights of Asylum-Seekers,
105 VA. L. REV. 1667, 1707 (2019) (“Considering the immense backlogs in the immigration
courts today, increasing the administrative burden on immigration judges is a cause for
concern.”).
418. Abulashvili v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 197, 208 n.10 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Robert
A. Katzmann, The Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the Immigrant Poor, 21 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 3, 3 (2008) (noting that the Second Circuit’s caseload had nearly doubled due
to an “avalanche of immigration cases”).
419. Amid “Nightmarish” Case Backlog, Experts Call for Independent Immigration
Courts, AM. BAR ASS’N (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/abanews-archives/2019/08/amid-_nightmarish-case-backlog--experts-call-for-independent-imm/
[https://perma.cc/W59L-KJ7B].
420. See Eagly & Shafer, supra note 130, at 53 (showing the number of successful cases
by lawyer type); PAUL GRUSSENDOR, MY TRIALS: INSIDE AMERICA’S DEPORTATION FACTORIES
12 (2d ed. 2011) (“The number of judges and court staff would still have to be doubled to have
any meaningful impact on the overall quality of justice that is meted-out in these deportation
factories.”).
421. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
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Court explained, “A deported alien may lose his family, his friends and his
livelihood forever. Return to his native land may result in poverty,
persecution and even death.”422 Additionally, the value of counsel in
ensuring that the detained noncitizen’s voice is heard has been amply
described in a copious number of studies and follows from the complexity of
the legal issues and the barriers to effective pro se efforts.423 The
government’s interest in fair, accurate, and efficient proceedings further
militate in favor of the existing, more expansive view.
B. Assessing Accuracy, Efficiency, and Participation
Just as the Mathews factors favor ensuring that attorneys’ fees awards
remain available in immigration habeas proceedings, so do the procedural
due process norms of accuracy, efficiency, and participation.
First, the presence of legal counsel should add to the accuracy of the
proceedings. They ensure that the judges hear expert arguments from both
sides, which is particularly important in the immigration context, which
presents complex and technical issues.424 Lawyers should also be able to
effectively marshal the necessary evidence, which might otherwise be
difficult for individuals whose command of English is not a given.425 In an
adversarial system, these benefits increase the likelihood that the outcome of
adjudicative proceedings will be substantively correct and that the law is
being appropriately applied.426
Second, legal counsel can add to the smooth progression of immigration
proceedings and, often, reduce the overall social costs.427 Thus, even under
a thin view of efficiency that only considers the financial costs, the
availability of awards promotes this norm.428 When accounting for the
nonpecuniary social benefits, such as avoiding the disruption to
blended-citizenship families, the efficiency balances tip even more in favor
of the availability of awards.
Third, assistance of counsel is a virtual necessity if detained noncitizens
facing removal are to have a meaningful voice in the process.429 And this
enhances the participation norm, adding to the legitimacy of the
proceedings.430
422. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 164 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring).
423. See Noferi, supra note 333, at 72.
424. See supra Part III.A.2.a–c.
425. See supra Part III.A.2.a–c.
426. See Martin H. Redish, Pleadings, Discovery, and the Federal Rules: Exploring the
Foundations of Modern Procedure, 64 FLA. L. REV. 845, 852 (2012); see also Robert G. Bone,
Securing the Normative Foundations of Litigation Reform, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1155, 1162 (2006).
427. See supra Part III.A.2.b–c.
428. See Brooke D. Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1777, 1797–800 (2015)
(discussing and criticizing this phenomenon); see also Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost
Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073, 2073–74 (2002).
429. See supra Part III.A.2.a–b.
430. See Nourit Zimerman & Tom R. Tyler, Between Access to Counsel and Access to
Justice: A Psychological Perspective, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 473, 480–83 (2010) (discussing
study results).
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CONCLUSION
Given the traditional availability of habeas to civil detainees and the array
of statutory construction canons supporting the longstanding, unchallenged
understanding that the EAJA’s ambit encompassed habeas as part of the term
“civil action,” ICE’s attempts at jurisprudential change are best understood
as an example of the federal courts’ retrenchment movement that erects
barriers to the private enforcement of civil rights. The case study
demonstrates how nonacquiescence can be used by agencies to selectively
tee up issues for retrenchment and magnify the structural power differences
between it and noncitizen detainees. So understood, applying a procedural
justice lens demonstrates that the narrow reading is inconsistent with the
Mathews factors, which balance the detainees’ strong private interests in
liberty and remaining in the United States, the benefits of legal assistance,
and the government’s interest in enforcing the law. And, normatively,
promoting the availability of counsel in immigration habeas through
attorneys’ fees awards serves all three of the norms that define procedural
justice.
Looking ahead, new information might improve the assessment of the
legal, policy, and normative implications of ensuring the availability of
attorneys’ fees in habeas proceedings under the EAJA. Congress has passed
a bill that will bring back the EAJA reporting requirements and should
provide more accurate, concrete data on the actual costs.431 Additionally,
Congress has charged the DOJ’s Executive Office for Immigration Review
to explore the costs and benefits of providing legal counsel in certain
contexts, which might provide more broadly applicable lessons.432 Further
academic studies might demonstrate whether there is a causal relationship
between the provision of counsel and outcomes by controlling various
aspects of selection bias.433
Finally, the normative analysis supports the broader “Civil Gideon”
movement for appointed counsel in all adversarial proceedings involving
basic human needs and interests.434 This has special force in the immigration
habeas context—recognizing a right to counsel in these sorts of important
civil cases is consistent with international norms and human rights
431. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(5) now provides that the chairman of the Administrative
Conference of the United States must submit to Congress and make publicly available online
a report on the amount of fees and other expenses awarded during the preceding fiscal year.
432. See H.R. REP. NO. 113-171, at 38 (2013).
433. See Eagly & Shafer, supra note 130, at 48 (“In the future, a controlled study in which
immigrants are randomly assigned to counsel or self-representation would allow researchers
to address some of these issues of selection bias.”). The policy effects of the institutional
design choices of the immigration agencies also presents significant information gaps. See
Alina Das, Immigration Detention: Information Gaps and Institutional Barriers to Reform,
80 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 145 (2013).
434. Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart
v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 92–93 (2011) (describing “Civil
Gideon” movement); see also Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging
Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 978–80
(2012).
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conventions.435 This movement already is occurring at the state and local
levels in the United States and beyond its borders—it is past time that federal
policymakers consider it, too.436

435. See Zachary H. Zarnow, Note, Obligation Ignored: Why International Law Requires
the United States to Provide Adequate Civil Legal Aid, What the United States Is Doing
Instead, and How Legal Empowerment Can Help, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 273,
277–78 (2011).
436. Ryo, supra note 371, at 505 (noting the United States “lags behind 49 other countries
in recognizing a right to legal assistance in civil matters”); Rachel Baye, Maryland Lawmakers
Consider Guaranteeing Lawyers for Immigrants Facing Deportation, WYPR (Jan. 26, 2021,
9:49 PM), https://www.wypr.org/post/maryland-lawmakers-consider-guaranteeing-lawyersimmigrants-facing-deportation [https://perma.cc/54U8-L9RN]; see also Deborah L. Rhode,
Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869, 877 (2009) (providing
international examples in which a right to counsel in civil cases has been found).

